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Incidents of mass or targeted violence seem to occur without warning and lead us 
to conclude that nothing may be done to prevent them. These incidents may take the 
forms of mass shootings, stabbings, vehicular attacks, and other methods designed to kill 
or injure many people. Opportunities to detect and interdict potential attackers may exist. 
The literature identifies a host of warning behaviors that may be useful in detecting and 
disrupting acts of violence. This thesis examines the opportunities available to the 
nation’s 78 fusion centers to help prevent mass or targeted violence by learning to 
conduct behavioral threat assessments and management activities. Analysis of four police 
agencies that conduct behavioral threat assessments is conducted. Also, the National 
Network of Fusion Centers is explored to determine whether behavioral threat assessment 
and management may be a good tool to incorporate into current violence prevention 
efforts. It was found that fusion centers already perform basic behavioral analysis through 
the vetting of suspicious activity reports as part of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity 
Reporting Initiative. Preventive efforts may be more successful should principles of 
behavioral threat assessment and management be incorporated into fusion center 
operations. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Violence pervades every aspect of contemporary life. Technological 
advancements and modernization have improved the quality and longevity of human life 
over many years, yet violence among humans remains a pervasive challenge. Today, this 
nation is troubled by what is conceptually coined intended violence, including workplace 
attacks, school shootings, public figure attacks, and hate crimes.1  
Intended violence may also be regarded as targeted violence. Targeted violence is 
frequently reported in the American media and the term refers to actual or threatened acts 
of violence.2 As with intended violence, examples include stalking, workplace violence, 
and attacks on public figures.3 
Violence motivated by terrorism also remains a concern. Recent examples from 
western countries include mass shootings in Orlando, Florida; San Bernardino, 
California; Paris, France; and bombing attacks in Brussels, Belgium. 
Much has been written about the causes of violence. Arguments are made that 
violence is properly regarded as a public health problem and should be treated as a 
disease, or that violence is a learned behavior with an environmental nexus, or that 
violence stems from social problems, such as poverty, disease, discrimination, or 
educational failures.4 Others posit that violence is the result of flaws in American culture, 
overly aggressive parenting, the presence of firearms in U.S. society, the result of playing 
violent video games, or observing violent television programs or movies.5 Yet, the 
historical record shows that violence among humans has existed over the millennia, 
                                                 
1 Frederick Calhoun and Stephen Weston, Contemporary Threat Management (San Diego, CA: 
Specialized Training Services, 2003), 16. 
2 Robert A. Fein, Bryan Vossekuil, and Gwen A. Holden, Threat Assessment: An Approach to Prevent 
Targeted Violence (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 1995), 1. 
3 Ibid., 2. 
4 Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate-The Modern Denial of Human Nature (New York: Penguin Putnam, 
Inc., 2002), 308, 312–313. 
5 Ibid., 308–309, 311. 
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before the presence of firearms, America, violent media, educational systems, and other 
contemporary variables.6  
Roger Depue, former head of the FBI Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU), makes a 
similar observation in his book entitled Between Good and Evil. Depue ponders the 
nature of evil within humans and how the emergence of serial killers had occurred. 
Historically, he points out, such a phenomenon was often attributed to the same causes as 
those noted previously, such as societal factors, American culture, and so on.7 Depue 
then offers examples from history, such as a 15th century figure by the name of Gilles de 
Rais, who sadistically murdered 800 children,8 or how in London, Jack the Ripper 
attacked and disemboweled at least six women in 1888.9 Each of these examples 
preceded modern times, modern technology, the influence of violent media, or exposure 
to American culture.  
While much of Depue’s work pertains to the criminal investigations of serial 
murderers, rapists, and the crimes they have committed, lessons can be applied from his 
specialty to the field known as behavioral threat assessment. As covered in greater detail 
later, Depue was perhaps the first to use the term leakage to describe the process by 
which killers or attackers reveal or “leak” information during communications to others 
about their motivations, fantasies, and intentions.10 The concept of leakage is important 
to those investigating homicides that have already occurred, but may be of greater value 
for threat assessors and managers attempting to prevent violence. Additional so-called 
warning behaviors exist in addition to leakage that serve threat assessors and managers 
addressed later in this thesis. Detecting and making use of subtle behavioral indicators, 
such as leakage may offer hope to prevent violence rather than investigate it after it has 
occurred. 
                                                 
6 Pinker, The Blank Slate-The Modern Denial of Human Nature, 306. 




10 Ibid., 155. 
 3 
Writing in The Blank Slate—The Modern Denial of Human Nature, Steven Pinker 
quotes Winston Churchill, who offered this assessment of humanity, “The story of the 
human race is war. Except for brief and precarious interludes there has never been peace 
in the world; and long before history began murderous strife was universal and 
unending.”11 
Pinker notes Churchill’s dim assessment of human nature and makes the case that 
violence is best understood through study of the human mind.12 Psychological study of 
violence and those who may engage in violence is not a simple undertaking. Behavioral 
threat assessment expert J. Reid Meloy cautions that when attempting to evaluate the risk 
for violence in a person, it is crucial to recognize two things. First, people will always 
know less than they think they do about the person of our concern.13 Second, mental 
health services cannot repair all abnormal human behaviors.14 
Where does this leave everyone? If violence is a natural condition of human 
nature as Pinker argues, and if knowledge of people is limited and some people are 
unable to be steered away from a violent decision by mental health professionals as 
Meloy warns, how can the terrible instances of violence plaguing this nation be 
prevented? 
Over time, the effort to understand and prevent violence has been attempted by 
academics and practitioners. This thesis focuses on a process known as behavioral threat 
assessment and management. Organizations successfully utilizing behavioral threat 
assessment and management are explored. It also explores the opportunities that may 
exist to leverage some or all of the nation’s 78 fusion centers to prevent violence by 
facilitating behavioral threat assessments and developing threat management strategies. 
Through established programs, such as the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting 
Initiative (NSI-SAR), use of the intelligence cycle, and conducting all-hazards 
                                                 
11 Pinker, The Blank Slate-The Modern Denial of Human Nature, 306. 
12 Ibid., 317. 
13 J. Reid Meloy, Violence Risk and Threat Assessment (San Diego, CA: Specialized Training 
Services, 2000), 3. 
14 Ibid. 
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intelligence analysis, fusion centers are already incorporating behavioral criteria into their 
analytic and informative processes.15 Considering the opportunities to prevent violence 
through behavioral threat assessment and management, an analysis of the process and 
potential for use by fusion centers is in order. Finally, policies currently in use by other 
organizations are considered for use in fusion centers to contribute to the larger effort to 
prevent violence. 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the opportunities for the nation’s fusion 
centers to augment efforts to prevent mass or targeted violence by utilizing the principles 
of behavioral threat assessment and management. Mass violence and murder resulting 
from terrorist attacks, school shootings, stalking, and other tactics presents exceptional 
challenges for public safety officials. The evolution of fusion centers to include all 
hazards-all crimes priorities has created greater utility and greater opportunities to serve 
local, state, and federal law enforcement and public safety partners. Building on the 
behavioral analysis that accompanied the NSI-SAR may augment the impact of fusion 
centers to prevent violence and other crimes. Specifically, the incorporation of the 
principles of behavioral threat assessment and management by fusion centers may lead to 
the disruption and prevention of a host of violent acts that would otherwise have 
occurred. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Behavioral threat assessment and management is a process that has been 
successfully utilized by many organizations, including the Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD), the United States Capital Police (USCP), the United States 
Marshals Service (USMS), and the United States Secret Service (USSS). It is also in use 
by many of the nation’s colleges and universities to mitigate threats that arise at 
educational institutions. Can this process also be used by the nation’s fusion centers to 
prevent mass or targeted violence? If so, what adaptations to the process may be required 
for fusion centers to make positive use of it? What may be learned and applied from those 
                                                 
15 “Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI)—About the NSI,” accessed July 24, 2016, https://nsi.ncirc.gov/ 
about_nsi.aspx.  
 5 
who employ the behavioral threat assessment and management methodology for the 
purpose of violence prevention? 
  
 6 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Three sub-literatures provide the foundation upon which the research in this thesis 
is conducted, violence and threat typology, responses to violence, and the prevention of 
violence. The prevention category includes historic responses to violence, legislation, 
tactics, and preventive measures. Among the preventive measures are fusion center 
operations, the NSI-SAR, behavioral threat management and the organizations that 
employ this method for violence prevention.  
A. VIOLENCE AND THREAT TYPOLOGY 
Incidents of unforeseen violence present exceptional challenges to security 
services and the public. Examples include active shooters motivated by political or 
religious ideologies or those afflicted with mental illness or other personal concerns. 
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the term “active shooter is used 
by law enforcement to describe a situation in which a shooting is in progress and an 
aspect of the crime may affect the protocols used in responding to and reacting at the 
scene of the incident.”16 Further, to label a shooting as “active” means that the 
circumstances of such an incident may be affected by police responders or even citizens, 
depending upon the circumstances.17 Since 70% of active shooting incidents end in less 
than five minutes and 36% end in two minutes or less,18 the public has been encouraged 
to consider its own counter-measures since a police response to an active shooter is often 
not fast enough to prevent loss of life. The FBI notes a publicly released 2013 video 
created by the Houston Mayor’s Office of Public Safety and Homeland Security entitled 
“Run. Hide. Fight. Surviving an Active Shooter Incident”19 that provides guidance to 
citizens regarding ways to protect themselves and others during an active shooting 
                                                 
16 John Peterson Blair and Katherine W. Schweit, “A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000–2013,” 
University of Colorado at Boulder, 4, 2013, https://hazdoc.colorado.edu/handle/10590/2712. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 8. 
19 “Run. Hide. Fight. Surviving an Active Shooter Event,” video, 2013, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/
cirg/active-shooter-and-mass-casualty-incidents/run-hide-fight-video.  
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incident. The video portrays a fictional active shooting incident in an urban setting and 
the reactions of those affected.20 It illustrates the vulnerability of people when faced with 
an active shooter. Concluding its 2013 analysis of active shooter incidents between 2000 
and 2013, the FBI reported that avoidance of active shooter tragedies is the best outcome, 
adding that prevention efforts within all affected communities are critical.21 The need to 
identify active shooter prevention measures and prevention strategies for other forms of 
violence thus contributes to this literature review. Research exists that explores 
techniques by which assessments of potentially violent behavior may be accomplished, 
such as the use of social media by terror organizations to recruit followers to commit 
mass murder, and opportunities to use social media to disrupt the pervasive gang violence 
occurring across the United States. 
Targeted violence is not exclusive to active shooters or incidents of mass murder 
perpetuated by those afflicted with mental illness. Violence also occurs via gang conflict, 
terrorism, domestic disputes, and other crimes. The Association of Threat Assessment 
Professionals (ATAP) studies violence and works with public and private organizations 
to help prevent violence by sharing information, research, and practices with others in 
need of guidance regarding threat management.22  
Research is evolving and growing as it pertains to violent incidents, indicators of 
pending violence, threat assessment protocols, and techniques by which to study or 
prevent violence. Threats of violence are diverse. However, opportunities to detect and 
possibly prevent violent acts exist, which is reflected in the diversity of literature 
available on this topic. For example, the rapidly developing realm of social media has 
lead to a host of new studies concerning the numerous variables that may contribute or 
prevent violence. Understanding the impact of social media on the opportunities to detect 
threats and mitigate them is important. However, the research also revealed the 
importance of developing a process by which threats may be detected, considered, and 
                                                 
20 “Run. Hide. Fight. Surviving an Active Shooter Event.” 
21 Blair and Schweit, “A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000–2013,” 21. 
22 “About ATAP,” 2013, http://www.atapworldwide.org/?page=1. 
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handled. First, a discussion of the historic responses to violence is useful and follows in 
Part B. 
B. RESPONSES TO VIOLENCE 
Robert Fein, Bryan Vossekuil, and Gwen Holden, writing for the National 
Institute of Justice, observe that the traditional policing methods in use by American law 
enforcement has been reactive and designed to investigate and prosecute criminals after 
offenses have occurred.23 Borum, Fein, Vossekuil, and Berglund, writing for the journal 
Behavioral Sciences and the Law, also note that the historic role of American law 
enforcement has been reactive, not preventive.24 They go on to note that the expectations 
of law enforcement are evolving and that now, law enforcement and mental health 
providers are challenged with the ongoing needs to provide assessments pertaining to the 
potential for those who have previously engaged in violence police to repeat their acts, as 
well as the types of violence that may be carried out.25 
C. PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE  
1. Traditional Responses to Violence 
Fein, Vossekuil, and Holden note that clearly articulated protocols or procedures 
are not currently in place among the larger law enforcement community.26 Their study 
includes recommendations for establishing a threat assessment and management program. 
They go on to suggest that threat assessment is best accomplished by establishing a 
structured process or program by which those who pose a threat of violence may be 
identified, assessed, and managed in such a way that they are steered or guided away 
from a decision to carry out a violent act.27 Building on this, Borum et al.  note that 
police officers, workplace managers, school officials, and others are responsible for 
                                                 
23 Fein, Vossekuil, and Holden, Threat Assessment: An Approach to Prevent Targeted Violence, 2. 
24 Randy Borum et al., “Threat Assessment: Defining an Approach for Evaluating Risk for Targeted 
Violence,” Behavioral Sciences & the Law 17, no. 3 (1999): 324.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Fein, Vossekuil, and Holden, Threat Assessment: An Approach to Prevent Targeted Violence, 3. 
27 Borum et al., “Threat Assessment: Defining an Approach for Evaluating Risk for Targeted 
Violence,” 326. 
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taking action upon receipt of potential threats in their organizations.28 John Jarvis and J. 
Amber Sherer also recommend the utility of multi-disciplinary threat management efforts 
to improve the likelihood of successful prevention.29 They note that law enforcement has 
embraced crime prevention programs over the years but threat management requires the 
input of stakeholders outside of the law enforcement community to ensure the broadest 
visibility and understanding of cases being managed.30 Further, they add that a need 
exists for collaboration when conducting threat assessments. Continuing, Jarvis and 
Sherer claim that collaboration may help shift the traditional reactive culture of policing 
toward a more proactive approach; while also improving reporting from the community 
as a result of improved community relations.31 
2. Prevention of Violence through Behavioral Threat Management  
Andrew Harris and Arthur Lurigio, in the Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations, 
noting that law enforcement personnel are expected by the public to respond to threats of 
targeted violence, while balancing the need to protect civil liberties, also support this 
view.32 They add that law enforcement must consider the adoption of new methods and 
skills coupled with changes in resource deployment.33 
Building on this concept, Frederick Calhoun and Stephen Weston argue that threat 
assessment differs from traditional criminal investigations in that a logical conclusion is 
often elusive. Criminal cases conclude upon arrest and conviction of a perpetrator. Threat 
assessment cases do not’ usually end this way. Often, an opportunity exists to arrest a 
suspect, but neither an arrest nor conviction necessarily reduces the need to manage the 
                                                 
28 Borum et al., “Threat Assessment: Defining an Approach for Evaluating Risk for Targeted 
Violence,” 324. 
29 John Jarvis and J. Amber Scherer, Mass Victimization-Promising Avenues for Prevention 
(Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2015), 11. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 4. 
32 Andrew J. Harris and Arthur J. Lurigio, “Threat Assessment and Law Enforcement Practice,” 
Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations 12, no. 1 (May 2012): 52, doi: 10.1080/15332586.2012.645375.  
33 Ibid., 53. 
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threat, as incarceration allows for time to plan for violent action upon being released.34 
Calhoun and Weston argue that threat assessment is an ongoing process that requires 
diligent attention.  
J. Reid Meloy and Mary Ellen O’Toole caution about the need to establish a 
process by which threat assessments may be accomplished, stating, “unstructured 
professional judgment relies on the notion of ipsi dixit, literally; ‘he himself said it’, and 
when translated into common parlance means the assessor knows it is true because he is 
the assessor and he knows best.”35 Thus, unstructured professional judgment is a poor 
tool by which to assess threats. Meloy and O’Toole, therefore, advocate for a process 
governed by structured professional judgment, whereby assessors evaluate threats based 
upon eight identified types of warning behaviors.36  
Mary Ellen O’Toole and Sharon Smith wrote chapter 18 of the International 
Handbook of Threat Assessment. This chapter is focused upon documenting the 
fundamentals of threat assessment for beginners.37 Regarding the necessity for specific 
processes, the authors note that it is important to define the purpose of a threat assessment 
program because doing so helps clarify the background and expertise of those who 
should be involved, their roles, how threats may be managed, and how strategies for 
intervention are developed.38 
Andre Simons and Ronald Tunkel, writing chapter 12 of the book International 
Handbook of Threat Assessment, speak to the need to establish protocols by which 
assessments are made so that the quality of assessments may improve.39 The authors 
                                                 
34 Calhoun and Weston, Contemporary Threat Management, 266. 
35 J. Reid Meloy and Mary Ellen O’Toole, “The Concept of Leakage in Threat Assessment,” 
Behavioral Sciences & the Law 29, no. 4 (July 2011): 514, doi: 10.1002/bsl.986.  
36 Ibid. 
37 Mary Ellen O’Toole and Sharon S. Smith, “Fundamentals of Threat Assessment for Beginners,” in 
International Handbook of Threat Assessment, ed. J. Reid Meloy and Jens Hoffmann (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 272. 
38 Ibid., 274. 
39 Andre Simons and Ronald Tunkel, “The Assessment of Anonymous Threatening Communications,” 
in International Handbook of Threat Assessment, ed. J. Reid Meloy and Jens Hoffmann (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 195.  
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provide commentary in this chapter about historical research conducted by the U.S. 
Secret Service and the joint Safe School Initiative coordinated by the U.S. Department of 
Education and U.S. Secret Service, which showed that offenders who committed targeted 
acts of violence rarely issued a directly-communicated threat to their intended target prior 
to attacking.40 As members of the FBI Behavioral Analysis Unit, the authors describe the 
process by which threats are reported to a threat assessment team (TAT) for analysis.  
Using a hybrid group of professionals and structured professional judgment 
approach to develop the analysis of threats fully, the TAT begins the process with a set of 
“triage questions.”41 Following this step, additional analysis unfolds regarding the mode 
of delivery of the threat, victimology and potential relationships between target and 
attacker, motive, veracity, resolution to commit violence, and imminence in threatening 
communications.42 The TAT members then individually assess the threat and later 
combine their work into a team consensus followed with a written report.43 Concluding, 
Simons and Tunkel note the process they use in the FBI’s behavioral assessment unit 
represent only one methodology for evaluating anonymous threatening communications, 
adding that no single process will be adequate for all of the various circumstances with 
which threat assessors may be faced.44  
3. Warning Behaviors and Threat Assessment 
Fein, Vossekuil and Holden posit that violence is a process and often occurs as 
the culmination of identifiable problems, disputes, or conflicts that have developed over 
time.45 Writing Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations, Robert 
Fein and Bryan Vossekuil report “almost without exception, assassinations, attacks, and 
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near-attacks are neither impulsive nor spontaneous acts.”46 Therefore, the literature 
suggests that opportunities exist for law enforcement and others to identify warning 
behaviors and utilize a threat management process to prevent violence from occurring. 
Katie Cohen et al. discussed linguistic markers for radical violence in social 
media in a 2014 study within the journal Terrorism and Political Violence. They note that 
lone actor terrorism remains a marginal phenomenon compared to other acts of 
terrorism.47 Nevertheless, cause for concern about this form of violence is growing 
because  
the capability threshold for individuals to carry out advanced attacks is 
becoming lower with time due to the power of the Internet to bring critical 
information, such as tutorials on bomb-making or geographical 
information, ‘to your fingertips’. There is also concern that the Internet is 
making it easier than ever to engage in the study and dissemination of 
extremist views. Finally, a third reason is that many methods employed by 
security services and police to uncover and prevent group plots are of little 
use when the perpetrator is acting alone.48  
This point leads to the possibility that a focused threat assessment process may help parse 
the contents of certain social media content to predict and stop violence before it occurs.  
Building on this concept of assessment and intervention, Frederick Calhoun and 
Stephen Weston writing in their book, Contemporary Threat Management: A Practical 
Guide of Identifying, Assessing, and Managing Individuals of Violent Intent, articulate 
threat assessment principles that have been used by many professionals over the years to 
detect and prevent potential violence. Supported by case studies, the book posits that 
retroactive analysis of violent acts reveals noticeable behaviors that could have been 
detectable during the thinking, planning, preparing, and talking of a violent actor.49 The 
authors also make the argument that a need exits for an established threat management 
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process for those professionals who endeavor to detect and disrupt violent action before it 
occurs.50 This process is called behavioral threat management and rather than attempting 
to predict violence, it involves the creation of proactive procedures that allow law 
enforcement personnel or others to identify potential threats, assess and investigate them, 
and craft a plan to manage the threats to prevent violence.51  
Written in 2003, Contemporary Threat Management preceded the rise of social 
media and its impact in current times. However, the material regarding the process by 
which threat assessments should be organized and conducted remains highly relevant and 
is routinely cited by researchers of follow-up works in more recent years. Important to 
social media communications, Calhoun and Weston discuss the concept of “hunters 
versus howlers.”52 This phrase pertains to the value of parsing and understanding 
communication that may not immediately be clear. The need to understand such 
communication is because hunters and howlers behave differently, hunters act and 
howlers talk.53  
Meloy and O’Toole built on the work on Calhoun and Weston by noting ways in 
which a hunter or a howler might be detected in their 2011 study in the journal 
Behavioral Sciences and the Law entitled, “The Concept of Leakage in Threat 
Assessment.”54 Leakage in this context is defined as “communication to a third party of 
an intent to harm a target.”55 Leakage is further noted to be a form of warning behavior 
that “occurs in a majority of cases of attacks on and assassinations of public figures, adult 
mass murderers, adolescent mass murderers, and school or campus shootings: very low 
frequency, but catastrophic acts of intended and targeted violence.”56 Integrating the 
concepts of leakage with those of hunters vs. howlers helps determine whether language 
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gleaned through social media may be representative of a true threat (from a hunter), or 
instead, menacing, but unlikely to lead to violence (from a howler). Meloy and O’Toole 
note that leakage is one of eight scientifically validated warning behaviors; the others 
being pathway, fixation, identification, novel aggression, energy burst, directly 
communicated threat, and last resort.57  
Leakage is particularly important to this literature review, as it is the essence of 
the opportunity by which to use social media to detect someone who is on a pathway to 
violence. Meloy and O’Toole note that “among adult mass murderers who killed at least 
three people during one incident, the majority appear to leak their intent to third parties 
before they attack.”58 This leakage took the form of generalized (no location or victim 
pool identified) or mixed threats (generalized threat coupled with a specific threat).59 It is 
useful to illustrate an example of a generalized threat, which could be, “I’m going 
hunting,” while an example of a specific threat may be a suicide note describing a 
massacre in detail.60  
It is also useful to consider an example of leakage and direct threats from 
adolescent mass murderers, who engage in both at rates higher than their adult 
counterparts.61 A majority of mass murders do not directly threaten their targets; for 
example, “Tomorrow you find out if you live or die.”62 Leakage by mass adolescent 
mass murders is, “Wouldn’t it be fun to kill all those jocks?”63 These examples are taken 
from those who have committed mass murders, but do not address specific motivations of 
the killers.  
Opportunities sometimes exist to detect leakage from someone about to engage in 
radical violence. Such violence is often associated with so-called lone wolf terrorism. 
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Cohen et al. added to the research concerning leakage through their 2014 study entitled 
“Detecting Linguistic Markers for Radical Violence in Social Media.” They corroborate 
the work of Meloy and O’Toole by confirming the eight previously described warning 
behaviors, but add that searching for lone wolf terrorists is akin to “searching for a needle 
in a haystack.”64  
While Meloy and O’Toole focused on leakage, Cohen et al. also emphasized the 
importance of the behavior of identification as it applies to terrorists. This behavior is 
defined as one that indicates a 
desire to be a ‘pseudo-commando’, have a warrior mentality, closely 
associate with weapons or other military or law enforcement 
paraphernalia, identify with previous attackers or assassins, or identify 
oneself as an agent to advance a particular cause. Narcissistic ideas and 
fantasies about oneself are also counted in this group of warning 
behaviors.65  
According to Cohen et al.,  “lone wolf terrorists and attackers of public figures 
often tend to identify themselves as a kind of warrior or person who is prone to use 
structured violence for a ‘higher cause.’”66 Further, it is suggested in this study that 
commonality exists among all attackers. Specifically, the authors note that it is common 
to find Internet-based videos or photos showing attackers posing with their weapons as if 
about to attack.67 
4. Threat Assessment and Terrorist Threats  
There are also implications for the counter-terrorism effort currently underway. 
Writing in Studies in Conflict & International Terrorism, Mohammed Hafez and 
Creighton Mullins discuss the terror threat from radicalized Muslims living in the West.68 
They point out that Western governments are under significant pressure to identify and 
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disrupt “budding terrorists” before they become fully radicalized.69 Further, they note 
that analysts are taking on greater burdens due to the pressures of identifying the many 
variables that contribute to the process of radicalization by people who lead otherwise 
ordinary lifestyles.70 They go on to identify cognitive radicalization (embracing ideas and 
political ideals outside of societal mainstreams) and behavioral radicalization (engaging 
in activities that may result in terrorism) while arguing that violence often, but not 
always, follows the combination of cognitive and behavioral radicalization in a person.71  
Threat assessors may have opportunities to contribute to the effort of identifying 
the various pieces of the radicalization puzzle. According to Hafez and Mullins, the 
puzzle pieces include grievances, networks, ideologies, enabling environments, and 
support structures.72 These elements are individually discussed in greater detail in the 
study. Social media analysis may be one avenue by which the elements of the puzzle may 
be observed. 
Borum et al. discussing the process of threat assessment, argue that a conceptual 
approach to threat assessment has value because it does not require profiles based upon 
demographics or psychological traits.73 Profiles are shown to be fruitless pursuits, 
superseded by the individualized process of threat assessment, which is based upon the 
unique variables influencing the circumstances. Fein and Vossekuil, in their work 
entitled, Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations, add to this 
approach by observing that threat assessment also needs not utilize threats articulated 
verbally or in writing as risk thresholds.74 
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5. Threat Assessments and Mental Illness 
Frequently, when considering an act of mass violence, friends, family, or 
professional investigators may spontaneously conclude that the attacker “just snapped” or 
spontaneously attacked due to mental illness.75 The literature is not in full agreement as 
to the significance of mental illness as a factor in such cases. J. Reid Meloy, writing in 
the Journal of Threat Assessment and Management observes that when considering 
approaches and attacks of public figures, mental illness has a “substantial presence” in 
the analysis of the perpetrators.76 Borum et al. contribute to this observation by stating 
that mental illness is not strongly associated with violence unless the variable of 
substance abuse is introduced to the equation.77 This observation deals with the full range 
of violence and is not limited to analysis of mass targeted violence. However, Jarvis and 
Scherer assert that prevailing myths are associated with mental illness and mass 
victimization events and that they may be enhanced as a result of popular reactions that 
occur in the public sphere.78 They note that data correlating mental illness with 
homicides is lacking and associated with two prevailing myths.79 The first myth is that 
mentally ill persons are dangerous to others solely because of their mental illness.80 
While some forms of mental illness are associated with increased risk for violence, the 
authors point out that “not everyone who is a violence risk has a mental illness.”81 The 
second myth is that mentally ill persons must undergo a risk assessment for violence.82 
Thus, the authors point out that not all people afflicted with mental illness are likely to 
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become violent and usually do not represent the violent stereotypes common in the 
public.83  
An analysis of the Exceptional Case Study Project led Fein and Vossekuil to 
conclude that of those who had attempted assassination of public figures in the United 
States since 1949, mental illness only rarely played a role in assassination behaviors and 
the attackers functioned in deliberative and rational ways.84 Since many people afflicted 
with mental illness are well organized, Borum et al. qualify the importance of mental 
illness by adding that it is best used as a measure of someone’s functional ability to carry 
out an attack.85 Hoffman, Meloy, and Sheridan confirm the functionality of the mentally 
ill upon their review of the literature. Their piece entitled “Contemporary Research on 
Stalking, Threatening, and Attacking Public Figures,” and appearing in the International 
Handbook of Threat Assessment, states, “serious mental disorder does not mitigate the 
risk of a planful [sic] attack on a public figure. All studies indicate that despite the 
presence of mental illness, subjects can carefully plan an attack over the course of days, 
weeks, or months.”86 
6. Social Media and Threat Assessment 
Understanding the influences of social media on group behavior and individual 
human nature allows for the opportunity to provide the context against which judgments 
may be made concerning threat assessments. Terror organizations, homegrown violent 
extremists, looming school shooters, and others considering violence, manifest 
themselves in unique ways via social media.  
This influence presents the question of why social media is so effective for 
groups, such as ISIS or street gangs, prompting additional questions as to how it should 
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be analyzed. The research on this offers something compelling as it pertains to jihadists. 
Although, this literature review explores more regarding social media than matters 
relative to radical Islam or jihadists’ use of it. Writing in the journal, Behavioral Sciences 
of Terrorism and Political Aggression, researchers Sam Mullins and Adam Dolnik 
speculate on the nature of the “virtualization” of jihad and a subculture of “cool” that has 
grown around it.87 Mullins and Dolnik assert that this subculture, combined with the rare 
presence in the West of an experienced mujahidin (Islamic warrior), increases 
dissociation from reality in the mind of the consumer of such propaganda and elevates the 
mythological value of the message.88 Further, they noted the work of LTC (ret) Dave 
Grossman and his book entitled, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill 
in War and Society, by adding “the impersonal, indiscriminate nature of terrorism is an 
ideal vehicle for fantasy, since psychologically it is easier to kill when removed from the 
victim.”89 These variables may help explain the attraction for disaffected youth who wish 
to use violence against an overbearing and dehumanized enemy.90  
Social network analysis (SNA) is an avenue of research that offers promise when 
evaluating the manner in which Islamist terror cells may develop in the West, as well as 
the influence social media has on this process. Mullins and Dolnik explore the utility of 
SNA and identify several important considerations. First, they argue that group dynamics 
are important when considering contemporary Islamist terrorism in the West, as such 
terrorism is born from decentralized and evolving networks of people.91 Further, they 
argue that group interaction is a powerful component to the elements of radicalization.92 
Published in November 2009, Mullins’ and Dolnik’s study could not have foreseen the 
growth in social media integration into U.S. society of 2015, nor the emergence of ISIS 
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or other groups flourishing as a result of their social media success. Some relevance is 
lost since it was conducted, as it only considered group dynamics of Islamist terrors 
groups as predominately influenced by social settings, such as mosques, youth clubs, and 
gyms.93 Social media was not considered at the time of publication. The authors did 
acknowledge the emerging influence of the internet by reporting that “more recently, 
operational terrorist groups have been described as increasingly self-reliant, utilizing the 
Internet both as a meeting point and as a source of ideological and operational 
information in the absence of formal organizational support or control,” adding that the 
“‘virtualization”‘ of jihad indicates that spontaneous interaction among groups has 
greater significance and potential to push people beyond radicalization to terrorist 
violence.94 Notwithstanding the age of this piece of research, it more broadly dealt with 
SNA and its utility at understanding and disrupting people prior to violent action. It 
emphasized that it is important to understand group behavior and those that make up 
groups to understand better the relationships between behavior and social structure.95  
The influence of social media presents an entirely new element to this 
conversation. Margarita Jaitner of Karlstad University in Sweden offers analysis that 
builds on the work of Mullins and Dolnik. Writing in 2014, Jaitner points out that social 
media represent an attack vector that must be considered by law enforcement.96 
Regarding groups and group behaviors as influenced by social media, she states, “unlike 
previously, many groups today consist of a large but very loosely connected network. 
This lack of cohesion can present a challenge for authorities, to identify emerging key 
actors and assess threat levels. Second, a high level of web penetration has allowed 
groups to ad-hoc organize, amend plans, and redirect physical activities.”97 
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7. Social Media Indicators and Social Identity Theory 
Schmalz, Colistra, and Evans conducted research pertaining to social identity 
theory and the influences social media may have. Their study does not directly address 
gang and gang behavior, but it does emphasize important elements that dovetail with 
more specific research on this topic, which follows. This study approaches social identity 
theory and social media from a perspective unrelated to terrorism or active shooters, but 
it is relevant because it addresses validated principles associated with social identity 
theory and the manner in which social media has evolved to impact people’s sense of 
self-worth and esteem. This viewpoint is applicable to the literature that follows 
concerning the manner by which threat assessments may be conducted via social media 
analysis.  
Dorothy Schmalz, Craig Colistra, and Katherine Evans note that individuals 
striving to achieve high self-esteem may employ identity management strategies should 
their group be devalued.98 They note that when a social group is devalued or 
marginalized, the social identity of an individual belonging to this group may likewise be 
diminished as a result.99 Some compensate by taking action to reinforce their identities 
while others may conclude that group membership no longer serves them and 
withdraw.100 This process may have implications for the analysis of social media activity 
and posts when considering whether or not one poses a threat to others.  
8. Gangs and Violence—Opportunities for Threat Management 
Examples of this phenomenon commonly occur throughout American cities in 
recent years, whereby urban youths associated with crime and street gangs are 
committing violence against one another stemming from offenses taken and given via 
social media.  
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A 2015 Los Angeles Times article by Sandy Banks chronicled the evolution of 
gang violence and the influence of social media. The article quoted LAPD Deputy Chief 
Bob Green who stated, “Gangs are less hierarchical and more impulsive. They’re not as 
likely to feud over turf or look to ‘shot callers’ for orders. And the spats that lead to 
shootings more often are linked to insults exchanged on social media than to the wrong 
color shoes or stare-downs at the park.”101 Later, Ms. Banks describes the frustration felt 
by law enforcement when threats are made via social media but become known to the 
police too late to have a preventive impact.102 Consequently, the response has been to 
train and hire personnel who can look for trends or threats via social media to give the 
police a chance to disrupt potential violence, as the older techniques of community 
policing are proving to be less effective in this evolving environment.103  
Highlighting the evolution of contemporary culture as influenced by social media, 
Desmond Patton, Robert Eschmann, and Dirk Butler presented a 2013 study into social 
media on the phenomenon of “internet banging.” The authors assert that social media 
accounts are as important to gang members as guns.104 Social media forums are used to 
trade insults with rivals, brag about crimes committed, and project threats that often result 
in real acts of violence, often murder.105 The authors refer to concepts of collective 
identity and collective memory to help understand the power of social media on gang 
members and all human groups.106 The authors contend that internet banging is the result 
of “the problematic urban masculine identity born out of a collective identity formulation 
that has been shaped over time by certain social, political, and economic forces 
throughout American history.”107 This assertion is akin to those of Schmalz when 
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introducing social identity theory as a way to understand the weight of social media’s 
influence upon groups and individuals. This understanding may contribute to new 
opportunities to identify people or groups who are developing intent and capability to 
commit violence. 
The previously mentioned study by Jaitner makes recommendations concerning 
the manner in which proactive monitoring of social media should occur by authorities. 
She emphasizes the importance of establishing a framework by which social media 
should be considered.108 Conveniently, Jaitner also ties this process to the evaluation of 
group activities or potential by recommending that when atypical social media is noted 
detected and analyzed, efforts should be made by law enforcement to disrupt potential 
violence or unrest that may occur.109 The research previously noted contributes to an 
understanding of social media’s power as a communication tool and its effectiveness with 
reaching and influencing others who may be on a pathway to violence.  
9. Technological Aides to the Threat Assessor 
It may be concluded from these examples that opportunities to detect leakage via 
social media should be abundantly available, perhaps too available to manage with 
available staff. This problem may be addressed through additional research into personnel 
training and assignments coupled with technological opportunities to help. Technology 
offers the concept of automated text analytics, which are processes by which software 
and other automated systems may process written material on the internet or social media 
and draw conclusions about it without human judgment or influence.  
Referencing the need for additional resources to address the social media leakage 
problem, Cohen et al. note that opportunities exist for threat assessors and then delve into 
them. First, they describe text analysis techniques for analyzing social media.110 Written 
in 2014, the authors describe these to be translation services, sentiment analysis, 
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mapping websites, and author recognition.111 Each has promise. Translation services are 
often associated with free tools, such as those provided by Google that translate text for 
consumers.112 This technology is frequently used in fusion centers and police 
departments through commercial vendors capable of social media observation that 
includes functionality for keyword searches and reverse translation services.  
Sentiment analysis is described as the analysis of texts or mining methods of 
opinions appearing via social media and the internet.113 Possibilities exist in this area to 
offset the large volume of open source social media traffic that may be vetted by a 
mechanized process and well-crafted computer algorithms.114 Additionally, Bo Pang and 
Lillian Lee explored the advent of this concept and associated technology in a 2008 
article entitled, “Opinion Mining and Sentiment Analysis,” which appeared in the journal 
Foundations and Trends in Information Retrieval. Written to an audience interested in 
marketing and other business related enterprises, the article retains relevance to threat 
assessment as it speaks to common technologies and human behaviors observed when 
using them. Pang and Lee state, “aside from individuals, an additional audience for 
systems capable of automatically analyzing consumer sentiment, as expressed in no small 
part in online venues, are companies anxious to understand how their products and 
services are perceived.”115 The motivation of the companies mentioned in this quote 
likely extends to the police and security agencies in need of such technology for similar 
purposes. Security services will benefit from such technological developments made for 
the private sector by observing and assessing various forms of social media postings to 
glean threats and determine relevant courses of action. Incorporating automation into 
such a process may help reduce human oversights of potential leakage into social media 
postings.  
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Michal Kosinski, David Stillwell, and Thore Graepel note that through 
automation, basic digital records can be used to determine a host of individual 
characteristics that people would typically assume to be private.116 Such a concept has 
implications for threat assessments, as it explores the opportunities to observe the 
difficulty in detecting leakage of hunters versus the less threatening but prolific verbiage 
of the howler. Their study dealt with information and conclusions able to be gleaned by 
analyzing the “like” feature of Facebook and the items that Facebook users 
acknowledged by clicking the “like” feature within Facebook. The study demonstrated 
that with analysis of the “like” feature, much may be determined about a particular 
Facebook user to include predictors of intelligence levels, male homosexuality, male 
heterosexuality, ethnicity, political views, and religious preferences.117 Such studies offer 
a glimpse into the possibilities of technological options to assist with threat management. 
The concept of a threat triage is further developed in Chapter 21 of the 
International Handbook of Threat Assessment. The authors, Sharon S. Smith, Robert B. 
Woyach, and Mary Ellen O’Toole look at the anonymous threatener and use the analogy 
of searching for a needle in a haystack.118 The study addresses the use of language to 
predict approach and violence.119 Identifying the factors that may serve as predictors of 
violence is important, as are processes for improving the accuracy of these predictors.120 
The study then introduces the Threat Triage, which is a web-based software tool to assess 
linguistic characteristics of threatening messages.121 This software offers assessment of 
risk associated with a message as low, medium, or high and also calculates the 
probability that a message will be followed by targeted violence or approach behavior.122 
                                                 
116 Michal Kosinski, David Stillwell, and Thore Graepel, “Private Traits and Attributes Are 
Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
of the United States of America 110, no. 15 (April 9, 2013): 5802.  
117 Ibid., 5805. 
118 Sharon S. Smith, Robert B. Woyach, and Mary Ellen O’Toole, “Threat Triage: Recognizing the 
Needle in the Haystack,” in International Handbook of Threat Assessment, ed. J. Reid Meloy and Jens 
Hoffmann (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 321. 
119 Ibid., 322. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid., 323. 
122 Ibid. 
 27 
The authors conclude the chapter by asking, “How do we discriminate between those 
who inappropriately communicate dramatic but empty rhetoric from those who 
communicate, then approach and harm?”123 Whether using technology to analyze threats 
already made or using it to detect threats communicated through social media, a definite 
place for technological solutions exists to be used to help manage the threats coming to 
the attention of assessors, which allows for greater inspection of larger amounts of data 
and improved the accuracy with which the analysis is conducted. 
Threat assessment is an inexact process made more challenging when inspecting 
social media commentary. Merging technological advancement and improved processes 
may contribute to greater accuracy and improvements when preventing violence from 
occurring. 
10. Fusion Centers and the Violence Prevention Effort 
Prevention of violence has taken on a new urgency in contemporary times and 
resources and techniques are being marshaled to improve the effectiveness of the overall 
effort. Academia, law enforcement, mental health providers, the private sector, and others 
are working together for this purpose. The American Psychological Association even 
released a new journal in 2014 dedicated to preventive threat assessment entitled the 
Journal of Threat Assessment and Management.124 
Fusion centers arose en masse following the investigation into the causes of the 
terror attacks endured by the United States on September 11, 2001, known as 9/11. 
Building on the original terrorism mission, the all hazards-all crimes model of fusion 
centers has become the operational standard.125 In other words, the scope of analytical 
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effort is broad and that fusion centers are expected to support the growing needs of local, 
state, and federal law enforcement in the United States.126 
Part of the current effort to combat crime and terrorism is integration of the NSI-
SAR.127 Based upon identifiable and validated behaviors, this effort seeks to prevent 
crime and terrorism by using fusion centers to gather and share information pertaining to 
crime or terrorism patterns or trends.128 State and local fusion centers serve as primary 
areas of focus for the collection, analysis, and sharing of suspicious activity reporting 
(SAR) information.129 
Accustomed to collecting, analyzing, and sharing behavioral-based information, 
the processes and policies already in place by fusion centers may be leveraged to 
implement the behavioral-based methodology known as behavioral threat assessment. 
This implementation may increase opportunities to prevent mass or targeted violence in 
support of all crime missions. The prevention of violence, whether motivated by 
terrorism or some other cause, may be improved by enlisting the nation’s fusion centers 
through a convergence of policies pertaining to the collection of behavioral information, 
behavioral analysis, threat assessment, and coordinated threat management.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
Policy analysis is the methodology used for this study. This research evaluates 
policies currently in use by police agencies to prevent targeted violence and evaluates 
them for suitability of use by fusion centers to engage in the effort to prevent mass or 
targeted violence. Opportunities to modify policies already in use by fusion centers for 
this purpose are also explored. 
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III. THREATS AND VIOLENCE 
A. INTENDED AND TARGETED VIOLENCE 
Murderous violence takes many forms and those who engage in it do so for a host 
of reasons. However, the school shooters, lone actor terrorists, stalkers, political 
assassins, and even sadistic serial rapists and killers, engage in their crimes through 
deliberate and premeditated processes. These processes represent intended violence 
versus violence associated with crimes for profit or passion.130 Intended violence differs 
from violence stemming from a profit motive or violence resulting from an emotional 
release (passion).131 Thus, those who commit these types of violence engage in deliberate 
and elaborate planning processes including preparatory decisions or actions.132  
Intended violence is unique in that a wide range of variables may cause it as 
opposed to a singular objective (such as financial gain).133 Intended violence may stem 
from people motivated by an ideology, intent to act on delusions, efforts to acquire fame 
or notoriety, revenge, or killing classmates or coworkers.134 Preventing crimes for profit 
or passion requires that the cost to a perpetrator be elevated to make the risk unacceptable 
or to defuse the emotion that drives someone to commit a passion-based crime.135 
However, prevention of intended violence requires more.  
B. COUNTERMEASURES TO VIOLENCE—RESPONSE  
Compared to crimes for profit or passion, intended violence is multi-faceted. 
Violence stemming from passion is spontaneous, not premeditated, and is often generated 
in the heat of the moment through emotional conflict.136 By contrast, intended violence 
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includes intent coupled with plans to damage, injure, or kill someone without an 
uncontrollable passion or a motive for profit.137 Disrupting intended violence requires the 
identification of a potential aggressor, assessment of the risk, and a strategy to manage a 
person away from violence.138 This scenario presents challenges for those involved in 
public safety because people who may be progressing toward violence are hard to detect 
and disrupt. Thankfully, the processes of behavioral threat assessment and management 
have been developed and may help to help overcome these challenges.  
Incidents of unforeseen violence present exceptional challenges to security 
services and the public. Examples include active shooters, stalkers of political figures or 
celebrities, workplace attackers, gang violence, terror attacks, and more.  
Since 70% of active shooting incidents end in less than five minutes and 36% end 
in two minutes or less,139 the public has been encouraged to consider its own counter-
measures since a police response to an active shooter is often not fast enough to prevent 
the loss of life. The FBI notes a publicly released 2013 video created by the Houston 
Mayor’s Office of Public Safety and Homeland Security entitled “Run. Hide. Fight. 
Surviving an Active Shooter Incident”140 that provides guidance to citizens regarding 
ways to protect themselves and others during an active shooting incident. The video 
portrays a fictional active shooting incident in an urban setting and the reactions of those 
affected.141 It illustrates the vulnerability of people when faced with an active shooter.  
Concluding its 2013 analysis of active shooter incidents between 2000 and 2013, 
the FBI reported that the avoidance of active shooter tragedies is most desired, 
emphasizing the importance of prevention efforts.142 Writing in the Small Wars Journal, 
Ryan Hoover and Daniel Shaw emphasize the importance of preparation for active 
                                                 
137 Calhoun and Weston, Contemporary Threat Management, 16. 
138 Ibid., 17. 
139 Blair and Schweit, “A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000–2013,” 8. 
140 “Run. Hide. Fight. Surviving an Active Shooter Event.” 
141 Ibid. 
142 Blair and Schweit, “A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000–2013,” 21. 
 31 
shooter incidents.143 The authors note that many victims of active shooters fail to fight 
back or otherwise subdue an attacker due to a lack of basic skills and awareness of how 
to act during such situations.144 The merits of running, hiding, or fighting are typically 
considered with hindsight, after a shooting event has occurred. Hence, attention is given 
to techniques and methods for potential victims to defend themselves once an active 
shooting has begun. These recommendations do not include assistance from law 
enforcement because it is assumed that an adequate law enforcement response cannot 
happen fast enough to make a difference. Essentially, those targeted by active shooters 
are on their own and against long odds, must make fast and desperate decisions when 
attempting to survive. 
Running, hiding, and fighting are last resort tactics to employ when faced with an 
active shooter event. While important to know, it is also important to consider 
opportunities to prevent mass shootings when possible. Behavioral threat assessment and 
management offers the opportunities to prevent mass or targeted attacks. 
C. COUNTERMEASURES TO VIOLENCE—PREVENTION  
Considering this reality, for law enforcement to be of service, prevention is 
recommended as the most likely strategy for success. As mass victimization events are 
rare, a persistent notion pervades that “it won’t happen here;” thus leading to a lack of 
preparation.145 Behavioral threat assessment is an important element of the preventive 
effort.146 The literature concerning active shooting incidents and other forms of mass or 
targeted violence reveals techniques by which assessments of potentially violent behavior 
may be accomplished. It also offers hope for prevention and encourages the awareness 
that tragedies, such as mass shootings, are not inevitable or unstoppable; they can be 
prevented.147 
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Currently, research is evolving and growing as it pertains to violent incidents, 
indicators of pending violence, threat assessment protocols, and techniques by which to 
study or prevent violence. Threats of violence are diverse. However, opportunities to 
detect and possibly prevent violent acts exist in the rapidly evolving world of social 
media. 
D. TERRORIST THREATS AND SOCIAL MEDIA—EVOLUTION AND 
UTILIZATION 
Social media, alternatively known as Web 2.0, is a quickly evolving means of 
communication, with ramifications for disciplines, such as law enforcement and 
homeland security. Today, social media is regarded as being a significant recruiting tool 
used by foreign terror organizations, such as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 
Examples are available whereby ISIS uses social media to identify and recruit like-
minded people to its cause by posting images of graphic and sensational violence, such as 
shootings, beheadings, and other elements of jihad meant to be alluring to the viewer. 
Pertaining to social media engagement and its usefulness to recruit, ISIS members have 
remarked, “don’t hear about us, hear from us.”148 This remark represents a strategic 
adjustment by ISIS to assert control over the way its messages are received instead of 
allowing the mass media to control the narrative, as had been done in the past with its 
rival Al Qaeda.149 
Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, in their book entitled ISIS—Inside the Army of 
Terror, observe that the terror organization has adapted to messaging problems that 
hindered earlier jihadi groups and is instead using social media to combat this 
problem.150 They go on to point out that social media services, such as Twitter and 
Facebook, are effective and allow for large-scale messaging or crowd sourcing in 
spontaneous fashion.151 As an example, ISIS has been successful with its effort to cause 
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people to hear from it directly by creating pseudo-documentaries containing sermons 
coupled with violent theology and imagery.152 Oddly, these propaganda and recruitment 
productions feature content that many Western politicians and diplomats have felt would 
diminish people’s attraction to such groups.153 While containing graphic and horrifying 
images, the productions have been attractive to those new to ISIS and not repulsive. 
This attraction presents the question of why social media is as effective as it 
pertains to groups, such as ISIS, and offers further questions as to how it should be 
mitigated. The research on this topic offers something compelling as it pertains to 
jihadists. A “virtualization” of jihad and a subculture of “cool” has grown around it.154 
Lieutenant Colonel (ret) Dave Grossman, in his book entitled, On Killing: The 
Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, stated, “the impersonal, 
indiscriminate nature of terrorism is an ideal vehicle for fantasy, since psychologically it 
is easier to kill when removed from the victim.”155 These variables may help explain the 
attraction for disaffected youth who wish to use violence against an overbearing and 
dehumanized enemy. The influence of social media presents an entirely new attack vector 
that must be considered by law enforcement.156  
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IV. THE EVOLUTION AND INFLUENCE OF FUSION CENTERS 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Historically, police departments in the United States have been reactive by 
responding to calls for service and investigating crimes and preparing cases for criminal 
prosecution.157 However, school shootings, assassinations, terrorist attacks, and other 
instances of mass or targeted violence necessitates that law enforcement agencies identify 
effective strategies to prevent these problems. As with other types of crimes, the 
traditional role of law enforcement in mass victimization incidents has been reactive, as 
demonstrated through the evolution of the tactical response protocols to such 
incidents.158 While the tactical changes were necessary, it is now recognized that efforts 
to prevent mass casualty incidents are worthy of pursuit.159 Prevention is challenging. It 
must be accomplished while respecting and preserving civil rights, civil liberties, and the 
privacy of those who come under scrutiny for the potential to commit violence, as well as 
their potential victims. Organized police forces in the United States began by adopting 
the preventive patrol model first established in the United Kingdom in 1829 with the 
creation of the London Metropolitan Police.160 Prevention, in this context, was promoted 
through the patrols of uniformed police officers with the hope of altering criminal 
inclinations of people due to an overt police presence, thereby preserving public order.161 
As American policing evolved, it was discovered that the early strategies of random 
patrols and answering calls for service were not resulting in significant reductions in 
crime rates.162 Consequently, community-policing strategies were born.163 Generally, 
these efforts focus on utilizing the police to improve the quality of life in neighborhoods 
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by developing strong community ties to craft tailored solutions to localized problems.164 
The development of these strategies may serve the homeland security enterprise as 
quickly as the local neighborhood watches because the smallest of details, if reported to 
the right person or agency, may be the decisive variable in whether or not an act of mass 
violence is prevented. 
Fusion centers serve as the intersections between the public, private industry, 
police officers at each level of government, fire fighters, mental health providers, public 
health providers, and other public safety stakeholders. These junctions may be a good 
place to combine the totality of details in possession of each stakeholder for the purpose 
of analyzing certain situations or circumstances to help prevent violence.  
A 2012 article in Police Chief Magazine illustrates this junction and highlights its 
value. The author of the article is Lieutenant Colonel Ray Guidetti of the New Jersey 
State Police. Guidetti notes several examples whereby the New Jersey Regional 
Operations Intelligence Center (NJ ROIC) successfully supported local police agencies 
by providing intelligence and crime analysis to improve resource deployment, support 
cold case investigations, gun crime analysis, leverage state resources to help resolve local 
problems, and real-time tactical investigations, such as multi-agency responses to 
homicides.165 Overall, Guidetti persuasively makes the case that fusion centers, such as 
the ROIC in New Jersey, have much to offer local police departments beyond traditional 
terrorism analysis. Like many fusion centers, the ROIC is made up of personnel from a 
host of federal, state, and local agencies and is co-located with the New Jersey Office of 
Emergency Management.166 Guidetti notes that fusion centers, such as the ROIC, are 
“gateways” to the federal government on behalf of localities by providing access to the 
intelligence community (the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)) 
through SAR that begins at the local level.167 
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B. NATIONAL NETWORK 
Since 9/11, international terrorism and large-scale attacks by foreign terrorist 
organizations led to a change in mission focus by federal law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies. This new focus was directed at foreign terrorist organizations, most 
notably Al Qaida.168 Also following 9/11, numerous state and local agencies across the 
country worked to support this effort through the establishment of fusion centers in their 
areas of responsibility.169  
As the number of fusion centers has steadily grown from a handful in the early 
years following the terror attacks of 9/11 to 78 today, each is under the control of a state 
or local authority.170 Being a decentralized network, the focus of each center is 
unique.171 The National Network of Fusion Centers is a collaborative network of 
independent fusion centers designed to support and advance the capabilities and value of 
each center and the network as a whole.172 Organized as state or local entities with 
varying designs, the fusion centers of the network have evolved over time from a 
terrorism focus to today’s more common all-hazards, all-crimes models. This evolution 
has been criticized as mission creep by some observers who posit that international 
terrorism should remain the exclusive focus of fusion center efforts.173 Nevertheless, the 
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Fusion Center Guidelines recommends the all-hazards-all crimes approach to operating 
fusion centers.174  
Since the FBI reorganized its mission in the early 2000s to prioritize terrorism and 
domestic intelligence collection to address the terrorism threat to the nation, the mission 
space for fusion centers to address international terrorism issues is largely occupied.175 
However, information sharing among partners remains the core responsibility of fusion 
centers; thus, the emphasis upon terrorism remains a priority.176  
As fusion centers matured, their analytical capabilities began to be leveraged for 
priorities beyond international terrorism.177 The all-hazards-all crimes model emerged for 
fusion centers after being recommended as part of the 2004 Final Report of the 
Homeland Security Advisory Council’s Intelligence and Information Sharing 
Initiative.178 All hazards intelligence has been equated to homeland security intelligence 
and is defined as “the collection and analysis of information concerned with noncriminal 
domestic threats to critical infrastructure, community health, and public safety for the 
purpose of preventing the threat or mitigating the effects of a threat.”179  
Public safety representatives from federal, state, and local law enforcement, the 
fire service, emergency management, corrections, public health, the National Guard, and 
a host of other federal, state, and local agencies combine in various ways to form the 
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nation’s fusion centers. Coordination of these diverse agencies fits the all-hazards all-
crimes approach to fusion center design and operation.180 
As part of the all-hazards-all crimes approach, fusion centers may categorize 
analytical priorities by areas of specialty. Examples of these specialties may include 
terrorism, gangs, cyber security, critical infrastructure protection, public health, fire 
programs, general crimes, and others.181 The analytical priorities of fusion centers are 
determined upon formal or informal processes by agency leadership or management.182  
C. THE NATIONWIDE SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTING INITIATIVE 
AND BEHAVIOR-BASED ASSESSMENTS 
Receiving, analyzing, and processing reports of suspicious activities are a 
fundamental mission of fusion centers.183 These reports help connect localized 
information to all levels of public safety depending on the nature and context of the 
information. These processes were identified as core capabilities that all fusion centers 
should address.184 The NSI was developed to provide guidance on how fusion centers 
should triage reports of suspicious behavior they receive.185 Raw perceptions made by 
untrained observers may be subjective; leading to spontaneous conclusions that 
something or someone is suspicious. Therefore, the NSI was created to vet suspicious 
activity reports and provide a mechanism by which privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties 
may be protected. This program identified seven validated behaviors associated with 
potential terrorism.186  
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Fusion centers have adapted to making judgments about behaviors as part of the 
NSI. Fusion centers also support federal, state, and local police agencies by answering 
requests for information from their databases. Databases may include employment 
records, firearms transaction records, police records management data, and other 
information. The relationships between fusion centers and police departments are long-
standing and have contributed to the evolution of the all-crimes all-hazards mission 
described previously.  
The NSI Concept of Operations was created in 2008 to create a process by which 
behavioral information and incidents associated with crime could be shared in a 
structured way to help detect and prevent terrorism.187 Therefore, an approach to 
considering suspicious activity grounded in behavioral observations allows for the 
elimination of useless criteria, such as race, ethnicity, gender, national origin, religion, 
sexual orientation, or gender identity as traits that may be used to validate suspicion.188 
As part of the NSI, 16 pre-operational behaviors have been identified to be reasonably 
indicative of terrorism and are shown in Table 1.189  
 
Table 1.   Defined Criminal Activity and Potential Terrorism Nexus 
Activity.190 
Behavior Description 
Breach/Attempted Intrusion Unauthorized personnel attempting to enter 
or actually entering a restricted area, 
secured protected site, or nonpublic area. 
Impersonation of authorized personnel 
(e.g., police/security officers, janitor, or 
other personnel). 
Misrepresentation Presenting false information or misusing 
insignia, documents, and/or identification 
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Behavior Description 
to misrepresent one’s affiliation as a means 
of concealing possible illegal activity. 
Theft/Loss/Diversion Stealing or diverting something associated 
with a facility/infrastructure or secured 
protected site (e.g., badges, uniforms, 
identification, emergency vehicles, 
technology, or documents {classified or 
unclassified}), which are proprietary to the 
facility/infrastructure or secured protected 
site. 
Sabotage/Tempering/Vandalism Damaging, manipulating, defacing, or 
destroying part of a facility/infrastructure 
or secured protected site. 
Cyberattack Compromising or attempting to 
compromise or disrupt an organization’s 
information technology infrastructure. 
Expressed or Implied Threat Communicating a spoken or written threat 
to commit a crime that will result in death 
or bodily injury to another person or 
persons or to damage or compromise a 
facility/infrastructure or secured protected 
site. 
Aviation Activity Learning to operate, or operating an 
aircraft, or interfering with the operation of 
an aircraft in a manner that poses a threat 
of harm to people or property and that 
would arouse suspicion of terrorism or 
other criminality in a reasonable person. 
Such activity may or may not be a violation 
of Federal Aviation Regulations. 
 
Table 2 shows the behaviors associated with the Nationwide SAR Initiative that 
may be indicative of criminal behavior or may be innocent. Context is required to 
evaluate these behaviors properly; thus, additional information is required before making 





Table 2.  Potential Criminal or Non-criminal Activity Requiring Additional 
Information During Vetting.191 
Behavior Description 
Eliciting Information Questioning individuals or otherwise 
soliciting information at a level beyond 
mere curiosity about a public or private 
event or particular facets of a facility’s or 
building’s purpose, operations, security 
procedures, etc., in a manner that would 
arouse suspicion of terrorism or other 
criminality in a reasonable person. 
Testing or Probing of Security Deliberate interactions with, or 
challenges to, installations, personnel, or 
systems that reveal physical, personnel, 
or cybersecurity capabilities in a manner 
that would arouse suspicion of terrorism 
or other criminality in a reasonable 
person. 
Recruiting/Financing Providing direct financial support to 
operations teams and contacts or building 
operations teams and contacts; compiling 
personnel data, banking data, or travel 
data in a manner that would arouse 
suspicion of terrorism or other 
criminality in a reasonable person. 
Photography Taking pictures or video of persons, 
facilities, buildings, or infrastructure in 
an unusual or surreptitious manner that 
would arouse suspicion of terrorism or 
other criminality in a reasonable person. 
Examples include taking pictures or 
video of infrequently used access points, 
the superstructure of a bridge, personnel 
performing security functions (e.g., 
patrols, badge/vehicle checking), security 
related equipment (e.g., perimeter 
fencing, security cameras), etc. 
Observation/Surveillance Demonstrating unusual or prolonged 
interest in facilities, buildings, or 




infrastructure beyond mere casual (e.g., 
tourists) or professional (e.g., engineers) 
interest and in a manner that would 
arouse suspicion of terrorism or other 
criminality in a reasonable person. 
Examples include observation through 
binoculars, taking notes, attempting to 
mark off or measure distances, etc. 
Materials Acquisition/Storage Acquisition and/or storage of unusual 
quantities of materials such as cell 
phones, pagers, radio control toy servos 
or controllers; fuel, chemicals, or toxic 
materials; and timers or other triggering 
devices, in a manner that would arouse 
suspicion of terrorism or other 
criminality 
in a reasonable person. 
Acquisition of Expertise Attempts to obtain or conduct training or 
otherwise obtain knowledge or skills in 
security concepts, military weapons or 
tactics, or other unusual capabilities in a 
manner that would arouse suspicion of 
terrorism or other criminality in a 
reasonable person. 
Weapons Collection/Discovery Collection or discovery of unusual 
amounts or types of weapons, including 
explosives, chemicals, and other 
destructive materials, or evidence, 
detonations or other residue, wounds, or 
chemical burns, that would arouse 
suspicion of terrorism or other 
criminality in a reasonable person. 
 
Sector-Specific Incident Actions associated with a characteristic 
of unique concern to specific sectors 
(e.g., the public health sector), with 
regard to their personnel, facilities, 
systems, or functions in a manner that 
would arouse suspicion of terrorism or 
other criminality in a reasonable person. 
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D. BEHAVIORAL THREAT MANAGEMENT—BEYOND THE NSI-
TYPOLOGY OF WARNING BEHAVIORS  
The aforementioned behaviors associated with the Nationwide SAR Initiative 
have been analyzed and scientifically validated by the National Consortium for the Study 
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland.192 
This study utilized data taken from the U.S. Extremist Database and the American 
Terrorism Study, each of which contained data regarding U.S.-based terrorists and violent 
extremists and their activities and behaviors prior to the acts of violence they 
committed.193 Researchers concluded that the pre-incident behaviors documented in the 
data align with the behavioral indicators of the Nationwide SAR Initiative.194  
Similar to the Nationwide SAR Initiative and the behavioral indicators of interest, 
threat assessment practitioners also observe and document behaviors and behavioral 
patterns. Also like the Nationwide SAR Initiative, certain behaviors have been identified 
in the literature known as warning behaviors, indicative of observable behavioral changes 
that serve as evidence of a growing risk for violence and an increasing threat.195 These 
behaviors are observable assuming that the ability to collect them exists via intelligence 
gathering operations.196 Warning behaviors, as shown in Table 3, are defined and 
categorized, providing a comprehensive typology that serves those conducting 
assessments and developing management strategies.197  
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Table 3.   Typology of Warning Behaviors 
Behavior Description 
Pathway Warning Behavior Any behavior that is part of research, 
planning, preparation, or implementation 
of an attack.198 
Fixation Warning Behavior Any behavior that indicates an 
increasingly pathological preoccupation 
with a person or a cause.199 
Identification Warning Behavior Behavior that indicates a desire to be a 
“pseudo-commando,”200 have a warrior 
mentality,201 closely associate with 
weapons or other law enforcement 
paraphernalia, identify with attackers or 
assassins, or identify oneself as an agent 
to advance a particular cause or belief 
system.202 
Novel Aggression Warning Behavior An act of violence that appears unrelated 
to any targeted pathway warning 
behavior that is committed for the first 
time.203  
Energy Burst Warning Behavior An increase in the frequency or variety of 
any noted activities related to the target, 
even if the activities themselves are 
relatively innocuous, usually in the days 
or weeks before the attack.204 
Leakage Warning Behavior The communication to a third party of an 
intent to do harm to a target through an 
attack.205 
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Behavior Description 
Last Resort Warning Behavior Evidence of violent “action 
imperative.”206 increasing desperation or 
distress through declaration in word or 
deed, forcing the individual into a 
position of last resort.207 There is no 
alternative other than violence, and the 
consequences are justified.208 
Directly Communicated Threat Warning 
Behavior 
The communication of a direct threat to 
the target or law enforcement 
beforehand.209 A threat is written or oral 
communication that implicitly or 
explicitly states a wish or intent to 
damage, injure, or kill the target, or 
individuals symbolically or actually 
associated with the target.210 
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V. EXAMPLES OF BEHAVIORAL THREAT MANAGEMENT 
PROGRAMS 
A. LAW ENFORCEMENT THREAT MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS  
The notion of a “gateway” to the federal government, first described by LTC 
Guidetti, may apply more broadly whereby fusion centers may add value to this nation’s 
security by offering behavioral threat assessments and behavioral threat management 
strategies for stakeholders at each level of government. Fusion centers may serve as 
gateways to each level of government by offering theses services. 
Threat assessment and management has been studied in a variety of contexts and 
the literature offers options to establish threat assessment and management programs. 
Behavioral threat management is a process used to help prevent and mitigate violence 
through a proactive analysis of ideas and behaviors.211 Those working to conduct 
behavioral threat assessment and management become aware of potential attackers by 
detecting them or receiving reports from others, assess the risk for violence, and craft 
strategies to prevent violence by managing the person or circumstances.212 Today, police 
agencies are faced with the challenges of identifying and responding to threats of targeted 
violence before they occur while doing so in ways that avoid encroachment upon civil 
liberties.213 
It is argued in this paper that fusion centers have a role in helping the arena of 
behavioral threat assessors and managers. This is consistent with and an extension of the 
all-hazards, all-crimes models of fusion centers that have evolved since fusion centers 
first began to appear nationally after 9/11. Also contributing to the need for fusion center 
engagement is the impact of social media as a growing dimension of communication 
among the public.214 Some fusion centers are already observing and analyzing open 
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source materials through social media by utilizing tools for the purpose of maximizing 
situational awareness pertaining to a host of topics. Among these materials may include 
social media postings pertaining to civil unrest, threats against police officers, threats 
against political figures, threats against schools, threats to commit suicide, and others. 
Consequently, threats made via social media and the need to resolve them has led to a 
growing awareness. Certainly, open source analysis of social media may allow ample 
opportunities to detect leakage warning behavior, among others. Threats are also 
communicated in traditional ways, such as by telephone, postal mail, or interpersonal 
exchanges. Agencies partnering with fusion centers, such as police departments, 
correctional facilities, public health departments, and the general public, also report and 
share information. 
Involvement of fusion centers in the process of threat management may create a 
new dimension to the traditional threat assessment programs already in existence with 
federal, state, and local police agencies in the United States or with the nation’s campus 
threat assessment teams. As noted earlier, some fusion centers are engaged in the active 
observation and analysis of open-source social media for analytical and tactical purposes. 
Pursuit of this information may allow fusion centers to serve as force multipliers for 
traditional threat management programs or teams. 
Police departments have developed threat management units in response to 
specific incidents, and fusion centers have been tailored to serve specific stakeholders 
who are mostly state or local sponsors.215 However, the need to manage threats goes to 
the core function of fusion centers.216 Beyond traditional SAR associated with counter-
terrorism efforts, fusion centers with all-crimes-all hazards obligations must consider and 
evaluate other types of threats, such as those directed against public officials or 
celebrities, threats presented by stalkers, threats presented by intimate partners, or threats 
of mass shootings at schools or public gathering places.217  
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1. United States Secret Service 
The USSS has a robust threat management program and is considered an 
originator of the process by which threats are detected and managed for the purpose of 
preventing acts of targeted violence against the President of the United States and other 
protectees.218 The Secret Service’s threat assessment approach is tailored to assessing 
and mitigating threats to those under its protection.219 However, the threat assessment 
model used by the USSS is also applicable to the evaluation of violence risk for threats 
outside the scope of executive dignitary protection.220  
The Secret Service’s brand of threat assessment was born from an analysis of a 
study entitled the Exceptional Case Study Project (ECSP).221 Lasting five years, the 
Secret Service partnered with the National Institute of Justice and the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons to study the thinking and behavior of those who, since 1949, were known to have 
attacked, or approached with intent to attack, American political figures or others with an 
elevated public profile.222  
The ECSP results helped craft USSS threat assessment protocols but were also 
determined to be of value to those at every level of government with law enforcement 
and protective intelligence responsibilities.223 Indeed, planned and targeted attacks affect 
many others beyond political figures or celebrities.224 Prevention of violence is the 
primary objective and understanding the processes by which threats and vulnerabilities 
are gauged may offer real opportunities to disrupt deadly situations of mass or targeted 
violence successfully.225 
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Following the ECSP, the USSS documented the results and made a number of 
recommendations for federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel who may use 
threat assessment techniques as part of their protective security assignments. Among 
these recommendations are guidance points to establish and implement protective 
intelligence programs by asking some important questions.226 These points include 
definitions of problems at hand, an identification of the scope and concept of a threat 
assessment program, an establishment of objectives, and an assessment of capabilities to 
make implementation possible.227  
The concept of protective intelligence involves programs and systems used to 
identify someone who poses a threat and the proactive prevention of violence.228 Also 
credited to the USSS, protective intelligence efforts are programs, whereby threat 
assessments are conducted and threat management strategies are devised as a result.  
2. United States Marshals Service 
Differing somewhat from the Secret Service’s protective mission, the USMS is 
required by federal law to protect the federal judiciary.229 Included are about 2000 
federal judges, as well as the many U.S. attorneys and their assistants and staff.230 Due to 
the vast number of protectees under its charge, the USMS must employee an analytical 
process by which threats are assessed and mitigated.231  
Threat analysis within the USMS consists of three steps.232 These steps include 
the initial reporting of suspicious circumstances to the USMS, analysis of the issue, and 
reporting of analytical results.233 The USMS utilizes analysts to evaluate threats and 
                                                 
226 Fein and Vossekuil, Protective Intelligence Threat Assessment Investigations, 23. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid., 24. 
229 Debra M. Jenkins, “The U.S. Marshals Service’s Threat Analysis Program for the Protection of the 




232 Ibid., 70. 
233 Ibid., 70–72. 
 51 
communicate their conclusions to the USMS threat investigators for continued evaluation 
and follow-up.234 
Threats or issues of concern that come to the attention of the USMS are often 
communications protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.235 
Analysis is conducted to determine whether or not such communications meet the USMS 
definition of Inappropriate Communications or Contacts (IC&Cs).236 The USMS defines 
IC&Cs as: 
• “Assault or attempted assault on a judicial official. 
• Suspicious Activity around a judicial official such as surveillance, 
vandalism or property damage, unusual activities at official’s 
residence, or suspicious inquiries. 
• Communication containing any single one of the following 
references, which are considered inappropriate: 
• Any threats, whether direct or specific, veiled (“You’ll get 
yours”), or conditional (“You’d better do… or I will”). 
• An extraordinary complaint or sense of outrage over the 
handling of a court case. 
• Pseudo-legal court filings from quasi-courts other than duly 
constituted federal, state, or local governments. 
• References to a special history or special destiny shared 
with the judicial official. 
• Evidence of suspicious behavior, stalking behavior, or 
research on the personal affairs of the judicial official. 
• Evidence of suspicious behavior, stalking behavior, or 
research on the personal affairs of the judicial official. 
• Religious and historical themes involving the judicial 
official (including admonishments for the judicial official 
to change lifestyle or personal behavior). 
• References to death, suicide, weapons, violence, 
assassinations, acts of terrorism, or war. 
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• Expressions of extreme or obsessive admiration or 
affection. 
• Obsessive desire to contact the judicial official (including 
plans for meetings, interest in home address or other 
personal information, stalking, surveillance, or following). 
• Belief that a debt is owed the person by the judicial official 
(not necessarily money, but any kind of debt). 
• Perception of the judicial official as someone other than 
himself/herself (an imposter, a historical figure, the 
suspect’s relative, God, or the devil). 
• References to public figures who have been attacked 
(Lincoln, Lennon, Sadat, Kennedy, Judge Vance, etc.). 
• References to individuals (or their acts) who have attacked 
public figures or committed notorious acts of violence or 
terrorism (Timothy McVeigh, Oswald, Hinckley, Sirhan-
Sirhan, etc.). 
• References or claims of mental illness, such as psychiatric 
care, anti-psychotic medication, etc. 
• References to bodyguards, security, safety, danger, etc. 
• Bizarre or unreasonable solicitations.”237 
While this list is lengthy, such behaviors or communications do not necessarily 
indicate that criminal activity is occurring or has occurred.238 Therefore, people engaging 
in these behaviors may not be detained or arrested as a result.239 Instead, the presence of 
these IC&Cs drives the subsequent threat analysis, which is performed by the USMS 
Analytical Support Unit (ASU).240 Comparisons are made between the threats at hand 
and past cases handled by the USMS.241 The analytical effort seeks to answer three 
questions: 
• “What is it about this communication or contact that resembles 
previous cases in which the risk escalated? 
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• What is it about this communication or contact that resembles 
previous cases in which nothing ever happened? 
• Is this person likely to act violently based on what is known about 
the previous cases”?242 
The analytical process that follows includes public and law enforcement database 
research to learn as much as possible regarding the suspect and the target.243 The cases 
are considered in their totality and judgments made on how to best protect those under 
the care of the USMS. 
3. United States Capitol Police 
Also using threat assessment as part of its protective mission, the USCP 
established a Threat Assessment Section (TAS) in 1989.244 Charged with protecting the 
535 members of the U.S. Congress, the USCP handles this effort somewhat differently 
than the USSS or the USMS. Specifically, the USCP is centralized in Washington, DC 
and does not have satellite field offices across the country, as do the USSS and the 
USMS.245 In other words, the USCP must establish and rely upon relationships with state 
and local agencies across the nation to gain assistance with threat cases affecting USCP 
protectees.246 
4. Los Angeles Police Department 
Behavioral threat management is not exclusive to federal police agencies. Local 
police agencies also utilize threat management programs and the LAPD has a mature 
program, created and tailored in the 1990s to counter threats to Hollywood celebrities.247 
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It was established following the investigation of Robert Bardo who murdered actress 
Rebecca Schaeffer in 1989.248 The investigation revealed that Bardo, obsessed with 
Schaeffer, had stalked her by repeatedly approaching and being turned away from 
television sets where she worked, writing her letters, approaching her manager with the 
hopes of being introduced to her, and finally, by learning her home address and going 
there to kill her.249 Learning from the investigation of Bardo’s obsessive approaches of 
Schaeffer, and her subsequent homicide, led California to adopt the first anti-stalking law 
in the United States.250 The new law sought to prevent similar tragedies by criminalizing 
stalking behaviors. 
Similarly, the LAPD determined that it needed to identify ways to prevent 
stalking and killing of Hollywood celebrities.251 Established in 1990 to counter such 
threats, the LAPD Threat Management Unit (TMU) has grown over the years in size and 
scope to include traditional stalking cases, workplace violence, and terrorism.252 The 
TMU also investigates threats to elected officials of Los Angeles.253 Contrary to 
traditional reactive policing methods, the emphasis of the LAPD TMU is prevention, 
leading to new challenges of how success is measured.254 This experience was shared by 
the USMS when developing its TAS. It received initial approval from agency 
commanders for additional funds and resources while also stating that success would 
mean a reduction in traditional police statistics, such as arrests or mental health 
commitments used to track police activity.255 This approach represented a new way of 
thinking about successful policing.  
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As the LAPD broadened its threat assessment priorities, the threat assessment 
model has likewise been broadly applied, as manifested through consistent growth of 
membership in ATAP.256 This non-profit organization was started in 1992 by the 
LAPD’s TMU along with other threat management practitioners, such as law 
enforcement officers, prosecutors, mental health professionals, and corporate security 
experts.257 Its purpose is to afford “its members a professional and educational 
environment and assessment/intervention techniques, which span all areas of case 
management. ATAP’s goal is to assist our members in becoming better equipped to 
protect those in need and manage threatening or high-risk situations.”258 Founded in Los 
Angeles, 14 chapters are now nationwide.259 
B. EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THREAT ASSESSMENT 
The dynamics surrounding threats that occur at schools and institutions of higher 
learning are no different from threats that occur outside of these environments. Cornell, 
writing The Virginia Model for Student Threat Assessment, points out that previous 
studies pertaining to school shootings concluded that a useful profile or checklist of 
potential student attackers could not be identified.260 Among these studies was the Safe 
School Initiative that was a collaborative research effort between the USSS and the U.S. 
Department of Education.261 This research was born in the aftermath of the 1999 mass 
shooting at Columbine High School and was designed to investigate the thinking, 
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planning, and pre-attack behaviors of the student perpetrators.262 The study reviewed 
cases of targeted violence occurring in U.S. schools between 1974 and 2000.263 
Therefore, the USSS (who conducted the research) recommended that attempts to profile 
potential school shooters be avoided.264 Listed as Key Finding 4 in the Safe School 
Initiative Final Report, the researchers concluded that schools should focus their efforts 
on student behaviors and communications that may indicate attack planning or 
preparation is underway.265 Instead, a behavioral threat management approach to 
preventing school violence was recommended since a number of warning behaviors were 
identified as part of the research.266 Most notable among the warning behaviors was 
leakage. Nearly all the students had communicated their intentions to attack their schools 
prior to doing so.267 
Building on the Safe School Initiative, the USSS and U.S. Department of 
Education, partnered again to create Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing 
Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates.268 This study reinforced 
the findings of the Secret Service’s Exceptional Case Study Project described earlier, and 
confirmed that most violent actors did not overtly threaten their targets prior to attacking; 
instead, they manifested identifiable behaviors before the attacks, that if observed, could 
have revealed a movement toward the choice to commit targeted violence, and thus, 
create prevention opportunities.269  
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VI. THE BEHAVIORAL THREAT MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
A. MULTI-DISCIPLINARY APPROACHES TO THREAT ASSESSMENT 
AND MANAGEMENT 
As has been described, the LAPD, USMS, USCP, and USSS have threat 
assessment and management units designed for unique missions. These agencies are large 
and well-funded. However, many smaller police organizations lack the resources required 
to stand up similar units to manage threats.270 Harris and Lurigio recommend alternative 
remedies for smaller agencies, such as cross-training of officers, mutual-aid agreements, 
and collaboration with state and federal police agencies.271  
Jarvis and Scherer emphasize the importance of multi-disciplinary approaches to 
threat assessment not exclusive to police officers.272 They also cite the models already in 
place among the nation’s colleges and universities, suggesting these will work well for 
other organizations seeking to establish assessment and management programs.273 
Hinman and Cook also advocate a multi-disciplinary approach to threat assessment. 
Discussing the unique circumstances associated with various threats, they observe that 
professionals from various fields may be more important to certain cases than others.274 
They refer to broad threat assessments needs that include stalkers and domestic abusers, 
workplace attackers, school shooters, stalkers of celebrities and political leaders, 
terrorists, and others.275 Management of threats born out of these various motivations 
may be improved by utilizing available subject matter experts as part of the team of 
personnel contributing to the effort.276  
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The threat management process is flexible and the totality of the circumstances 
may change, causing ongoing reevaluation and changes in action, much like the 
intelligence cycle. Hinman and Cook also note the value of the analysis of intelligence as 
part of the threat management equation by stating, “Intelligence analysis is critical to the 
threat assessment process.”277 They remark that the multi-disciplinary threat management 
efforts are made more effective when team members may creatively use available 
intelligence.278 Analysis may include data collected from the records management 
systems of police departments, employment data, and motor vehicle data of concerning 
persons, and other sources.279 
Scalora and Zimmerman, writing about the history of the USCP Threat 
Assessment Section, discuss ongoing challenges to the USCP Threat Assessment Section. 
Highlighting an area in need of attention, they raise the question about when a threat 
management effort should end once a threatening individual moves out of reach of a 
specific jurisdiction; with whom should this information be shared, and to whom should 
third party reports be made?280 The answer to these questions may exist in the National 
Network of Fusion Centers. 
B. PATHWAYS TO VIOLENCE 
The management of a threat with a behavioral nexus follows the initial assessment 
of the threat. It is the portion of the process describing the efforts by which a person may 
be steered, directed, or led away from the commission of a violent act. Using the 
“pathway to violence” metaphor as a mechanism to understand this process, intended 
violence is best understood as a process that is an amalgamation of what Calhoun and 
Weston describe as “discreet, sequential, recognizable behaviors.”281 This pathway may 
be visualized in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  Path to Intended Violence.282 
Once a threat has been assessed for the first time, a threat management strategy 
should be developed based upon whether or not the threatening subject has been deemed 
to be moving toward or away from a violent attack.283 Ideally, a multi-disciplinary team 
that regularly interacts and works together creates the management strategy.284 The 
multi-disciplinary approach is used today in college and university settings but is also 
recommended for broader use, outside of academic environments.285 As previously 
noted, threat management is used by a host of police agencies. Utilization of a formal 
process to assess and manage threats is imperative, regardless of the specific composition 
of a threat management team.286 A structured process fosters common awareness of cases 
being managed while ensuring that appropriate attention and context is being applied.287 
It also improves the awareness of case management supervision, allowing for 
opportunities to observe and reassess the management process over time.288 Application 
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of such a process ultimately contributes to the management team’s ability to offer a 
structured professional judgment.289 
As behavioral threat assessment has evolved, it has been suggested that the 
intelligence cycle may be an effective tool by which to assess and manage behavior-
based threats of targeted violence.290  
C. THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE AND THREAT ASSESSMENT AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Figure 2 is a representation of what is commonly known as the intelligence cycle. 
It helps visualize the process by which information becomes intelligence through 
analysis. 
 
Figure 2.  The Intelligence Cycle.291 
                                                 
289 Meloy et al., “The Role of Warning Behaviors in Threat Assessment,” 275. 
290 Rick Malone, “Protective Intelligence: Applying the Intelligence Cycle Model to Threat 
Assessment,” Journal of Threat Assessment and Management 2, no. 1 (March 2015): 61.  
 61 
In this process, raw information is developed into finished intelligence for use by 
decision makers.292 Utilized for protective intelligence matters, the intelligence cycle is 
effective because it satisfies the need for continuous feedback and reassessment.293 
Threat management strategies require feedback and reassessment and may be classified 
as non-confrontational and confrontational.294 While labeled this way for convenience, 
the threat management process does not require that one approach be selected to the 
exclusion of the other.295 The choices are informed by the ongoing collection and 
analysis of the evolving circumstances. Further, action or inaction taken by a threat 
manager will either make the situation better, worse, or produce no change.296 Hence, a 
need always exists for new and improved information and analysis. 
At this juncture, the planning and direction of the intelligence cycle serves the 
threat management process.297 Next, the collection of information for analysis is 
required. Three types of information are useful: human intelligence or HUMINT, 
geospatial intelligence or GEOINT, signals intelligence or SIGINT, and open source 
intelligence or OSINT.298 Each has value, but for the threat assessment and management 
team, HUMINT and OSINT are most impactful.299  
Noted in the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion 
Centers, the nation’s fusion centers use the intelligence cycle and OSINT to collect 
information and conduct intelligence analysis.300 OSINT is intelligence gleaned from 
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publicly available information, collected without special legal permissions or covert 
techniques.301 
The applicability of the intelligence cycle to threat management was discussed 
earlier. As noted in the Fusion Center Guidelines: 
The principal role of the fusion center is to compile, analyze, and 
disseminate criminal/terrorist information and intelligence and other 
information (including, but not limited to, threat, public safety, law 
enforcement, public health, social services, and public works) to support 
efforts to anticipate, identify, prevent, and/or monitor criminal/terrorist 
activity.302  
Based upon this description, and the duties set forth to adjudicate threats, the argument 
may be proffered that fusion centers should adopt protocols by which to conduct 
behavioral threat assessments and management techniques.  
Step six of the current intelligence cycle recommended for use by fusion centers 
requires “reevaluation.”303 Reevaluation serves the threat assessment and management 
process by taking new or developing information into account and informing decision 
makers, such as a threat management team. Building on the reevaluation step, producers 
of analytical products frequently offer statements that help their consumers gauge the 
degree of confidence that should be attached to an analytical product by employing 
statements of “analytic confidence.”304 
                                                 
301 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement 
Agencies, 63. 
302 Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, Fusion Center Guidelines, 13. 
303 Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, Fusion Center Guidelines, 19. 
304 Malone, “Protective Intelligence: Applying the Intelligence Cycle Model to Threat Assessment,” 
57. 
 63 
VII. ANALYSIS: FUSION CENTER INTEGRATION  
A. FUSION CENTER OPERATIONS AND THREAT MANAGEMENT 
Since the need to address threats of mass or targeted violence presents significant 
challenges to domestic law enforcement agencies, fusion centers may be well positioned 
to support the effort to prevent such acts. The U.S. Congress has defined the term “fusion 
center” to mean a “collaborative effort of 2 or more Federal, State, local, or tribal 
government agencies that combine resources, expertise, or information with the goal of 
maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and 
respond to criminal or terrorist activity.”305 Herein, the objective of fusion centers is to 
minimize informational silos to enhance information sharing and collaboration.306  
Likewise, behavioral threat assessment represents an effort to identify where 
information about a threat may exist and also break down any silos that hinder the flow of 
information to those who must collect and share it.307 This process is intuitive for fusion 
centers, as most are already engaging in similar processes to evaluate and manage 
suspicious activity reports relative to terrorism and other crimes.308  
Unlike the law enforcement agencies described earlier, fusion centers across the 
country do not currently have nationally coordinated or tailored responsibilities when it 
comes to behavioral threat assessments or management strategies. However, the all-
hazards-all crimes missions of fusion centers adopted by many centers means that they 
have been encouraged to avoid any limitation of their analytical focus upon specific areas 
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of the threat spectrum at the exclusion of others.309 Instead, they must address all the 
varying threats coming to their attention. However, this broad approach may actually 
improve the overall effectiveness of fusion centers when dealing with threats since many 
threats are not related to international terrorism but still require attention to prevent 
violence. 
The National Fusion Center Association produced a national strategy document in 
2014 to guide the continuing evolution of the nation’s 78 fusion centers through 2017. 
Within this document, the need to address matters relative to the management of cyber 
threats was articulated.310 While the need to dedicate time and analytical effort in the 
pursuit of behavioral threats is not specifically mentioned, the strategy does say that 
“because violent crime and terrorism are threats to our nation, the specialized knowledge, 
skills, abilities, and experience of one center must be available to all centers, while the 
increased capacity and analytical capability of the National Network must be available to 
all governors and major urban areas.”311  
As fusion centers have evolved since their inception following the terror attacks 
of 9/11, opportunity exists to leverage their capabilities to help manage the variety of 
threats that come to their attention. These threats may be presented in traditional ways 
(phone, letter, email) or through contemporary communication methods, such as social 
media. Such threats are likely to be handled in different ways across the decentralized 
fusion center network since each center has its own policies and priorities.312  
Common threats are specific behaviors manifested by potential attackers before 
acts of violence are carried out. Identifying and understanding these behaviors may allow 
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fusion centers to provide greater service and value to their stakeholders. Further, 
behavioral threat management strategies exist. Fusion centers may be able to facilitate 
such strategies for the purpose of preventing mass or targeted violence. A behavioral 
threat assessment and management model to be used by fusion centers may be replicated 
from those that exist elsewhere in law enforcement or school settings. Therefore, a threat 
management approach may be valuable to the National Network of Fusion Centers. 
The investigation and management of threats is most likely to be successful if 
agencies or systems beyond the realm of law enforcement are identified and used to help 
manage problems associated with a particular case.313 Fusion centers then offer 
opportunities to serve as the organizations that have the relevant relationships with the 
various entities required to manage threats successfully. Among these include, but are not 
limited to, prosecutors, probation and parole offices, correctional agencies, employee 
assistance services, victim’s advocacy services, community groups, and others.314 Fusion 
centers are also expected to work with public safety organizations, such as emergency 
management agencies, public health agencies, social services agencies, public works 
agencies, and the private sector.315 Notwithstanding that the foundation of fusion centers 
is grounded in the law enforcement intelligence function, it is recommended in the 
Fusion Center Guidelines that certain functional categories exist to maximize the 
effectiveness of the fusion process.316 These categories extend well beyond the 
traditional scope of law enforcement interest and illustrate the all-hazards-all crimes 
analytical priorities of contemporary fusion centers. As compiled by the Criminal 
Intelligence Coordinating Council, these include the following. 
• agriculture, food, water, and the environment 
• banking and finance 
• chemical industry and hazardous materials 
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• criminal justice 
• education 
• emergency services (non-law enforcement) 
• energy 
• government 
• health and public health services 
• hospitality and lodging 
• information and telecommunications 
• military facilities and defense industrial base 
• postal and shipping 
• private security 
• public works 
• real estate 
• retail 
• social services 
• transportation317 
Indeed, the integration of this wide variety of sectors into the operations of fusion 
centers establishes an ideal by which each level of government, the private sector, and the 
public can make contributions to the fusion process.318 Maximizing the variables 
(agencies and corresponding knowledge) being incorporated into the fusion process 
increases the overall quality of the analytical output of a fusion center.319  
The Fusion Center Guidelines present law enforcement intelligence as a phase of 
intelligence necessary to support fusion center operations.320 Thus, intelligence is defined 
                                                 
317 Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, Fusion Center Guidelines, 3. 
318 Ibid. 
319 Ibid., 29. 
320 Ibid., 15. 
 67 
as being the “product of systematic gathering, evaluation, and analysis of raw data on 
individuals or activities suspected of being, or known to be, criminal.”321  
As the Fusion Center Guidelines recommend diverse input into the intelligence 
process, a similar approach is advocated for successful behavioral threat management, 
which is often observed in the literature as a “multidisciplinary approach.” Time has been 
spent discussing the threat management process and the stages of threat management to 
include the identification of threats, assessment of threats, and management of those who 
pose threats.322 Accomplishing this process requires a comprehensive analysis of a host 
of variables to include warning behaviors, as well as environmental triggers that may add 
to someone’s proclivity to become violent, or to steer away from violence.323 This 
approach allows for the management of threat cases instead of mere risk assessments or 
profiles. 
B. APPLIED THREAT MANAGEMENT—THE VIRGINIA FUSION 
CENTER 
The author of this thesis is the director of the Virginia Fusion Center (VFC). The 
following information and examples are offered from his personal experience serving in 
this capacity. Beginning in 2014, the VFC recognized a need to develop a formal process 
by which to handle threats. Thus, it began developing a behavioral threat assessment and 
management protocol for use by the center. Born out of the need to handle a diverse 
variety of threats coming to the attention of the VFC, the policy development process 
involved research and interviews with subject matter experts at the USSS, USCP, the 
USMS, and the Virginia Tech Police Department. 
Since that time, the VFC has been requested to assist with a number of incidents 
requiring the analysis of threats with a behavioral context. Two examples are offered as 
follows to illustrate the manner by which a fusion center may support its stakeholders by 
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utilizing the behavioral threat management approach to prevent mass or targeted 
violence. 
1. Example 1—Potential Workplace Violence Averted 
During the spring months of 2016, the VFC received a request from a state 
correctional agency. After learning his employment probationary period would continue 
for another six months beyond the customary end, an employee of the agency abruptly 
resigned his employment and sent a series of threatening emails from his personal email 
account to his former managers expressing grievances and dissatisfaction with having his 
probation extended. The agency failed to collect the identification credentials upon the 
employee’s separation, so concern developed that he may attempt to enter the facility and 
harm his former coworkers or managers. This concern was founded in the totality of 
numerous warning behaviors that were considered. Among these were fixation, leakage, 
directly communicated threat, identification, last resort and pathway warning behaviors.  
These behaviors became manifest in the former employee’s expressions of 
grievances via email to his former employers coupled with sightings of him driving 
slowly through the parking lot of his old office while staring at the office. These emails 
were riddled with profanity, as well as threatening language emphasizing the subject’s 
grievances.324 The subject expressed blame directed toward his former supervisors and 
coworkers for the downturn in his career and the perceived impact on his life followed 
with a declaration that he was out of options and was now focusing on them for 
revenge.325  
Even though the language was threatening, but the VFC had to judge whether or 
not it was that of a “hunter” or a “howler” and whether or not the subject was merely 
making threats or if he posed a threat. The emails represented leakage warning behaviors, 
as well as directly communicated threat warning behaviors.326 The acts of driving to his 
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former workplace on multiple occasions and observing the building and surroundings 
represented fixation warning behavior.327 Context was necessary; thus, more information 
was needed. As noted by Meloy et al., “warning behaviors in this context are intended to 
be used as indications of a recent or current significant increase in risk which requires a 
response.”328 
Meetings between the VFC and the correctional agency’s security personnel were 
held to develop a strategy to prevent the subject from engaging in violence. It was learned 
during these initial meetings that the subject had a host of personal challenges including a 
recent divorce, financial stress, previously sought mental health services, was taking 
medication for depression, and was abusing alcohol. These circumstances may have been 
indicative of pathway warning behavior.329 He had extensive experience with weapons as 
a member of the U.S. military and the corrections field as a guard and probation officer. 
He recently sold his personal vehicle to buy firearms, also potentially indicative of 
pathway warning behavior.330 The VFC also learned that the subject was fond of posting 
images of himself to social media sites that portrayed him in apparel similar to that which 
is associated with outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs) while seated upon a Harley 
Davidson motorcycle. The subject donned a heavy leather vest (also known as a “cut”) 
adorned with assorted patches, motorcycle boots, and dark wrap-around sunglasses. 
These actions may have been indicative of identification warning behavior if the intent 
was to appear menacing or aggressive.331 Again, context was required for clarity. 
The VFC took the following threat management actions in the effort to prevent 
the subject from engaging in violence. When first presented with the case, the VFC had 
to determine whether or not the subject presented an imminent threat to others that would 
require a law enforcement response to take him into custody immediately.332 This step is 
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recommended for all threat management teams to help mitigate cases that have come to 
the attention of threat managers too late for management strategies to work or have 
progressed too quickly for contemporary threat management strategies to be attempted 
due to the imminence of the threat against a target.333 
• Consideration was given to whether or not judicial orders of protection 
should be issued on behalf of the correctional agency staff who had been 
threatened. While this step may seem intuitive to take, securing an order of 
protection requires the order be served on the person making the threat. 
Law enforcement personnel handle service of such an order in Virginia. 
The act of serving legal process upon someone who is the subject of a 
threat management case may have negative consequences if the subject 
feels humiliated, belittled, or bullied as a result, leading to the conclusion 
that no options remain except violence.334 This situation is known in 
behavioral threat assessment parlance as a “triggering event” and may be 
something that causes subjects to take some action that furthers their 
progression toward violence.335 
• The VFC arranged for a site survey of the agency facility by a crime 
prevention specialist of the VFC. Recommendations were made pertaining 
to security enhancements.  
• Armed security was recommended for the exterior of the correctional 
facility to detect and prevent approaches by the former employee. 
• The VFC issued an officer safety bulletin to state and local law 
enforcement personnel in the region to make them aware of the subject 
and the circumstances associated with his threats. 
• Notwithstanding the concern associated with creating a triggering event, 
an emergency protective order was recommended so that the subject could 
be taken into custody to be evaluated by mental health professionals. Like 
the order of protection, this step must be carefully considered because 
such orders usually expire after 72 hours and may lead  subjects to 
conclude that they can only settle the grievance through violence as a last 
resort. In this case, the protective order was deemed necessary due to the 
totality of what was known about the subject coupled with the content and 
nature of his threatening communications. Prior to service of the order, the 
VFC held a conference call with the correctional agency and the Sheriff’s 
Department tasked with serving it to help prevent the process of taking the 
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subject into custody from becoming a catalyst for violence. The Sheriff’s 
Department selected a deputy specially trained in crisis intervention to 
make the approach and contact the subject. The deputy was briefed by the 
VFC and the correctional staff managing the case and provided with 
important context regarding the subject to reduce the potential for violence 
when the subject was physically taken into custody. 
• The consultation between the VFC and the Sheriff’s Department paid 
dividends. The responding deputy made contact with the subject, 
established a rapport with him, gained entry in his residence, and made 
observations regarding the subject’s living conditions and habits. This 
information helped inform mental health providers who would triage the 
subject later. Most importantly, the responding deputy knew how to 
handle the subject due to the background information with which he was 
provided and the crisis intervention training he possessed. 
• Following the initial actions taken by the VFC, Sheriff’s Office, and the 
correctional agency, a longer-term threat management plan was created 
and implemented. This plan also included publicly funded mental health 
providers in the subject’s area and voluntary efforts on the part of the 
subject to seek their services. 
• This case was particularly challenging because the subject had almost no 
social support network except for the relationships he developed after this 
incident. These relationships included the deputy with crisis intervention 
training and a security staff member with the correctional agency. 
Ironically, those who might initially be perceived by the subject as 
persecutors became trusted advocates. 
• As of this writing, six months have passed, the threatening 
communications have ceased, and the subject continues to be periodically 
contacted by those from the Sheriff’s Office and correctional agency to 
ensure that he is functioning well. 
2. Example 2—Potential Targeted Violence Averted 
During the spring of 2016, another state correctional organization contacted the 
VFC concerning threats made by an inmate who was about to be released from 
incarceration. It was reported that the inmate wished to avenge a sibling who was 
incarcerated elsewhere in Virginia by murdering the prosecutor and judge who 
prosecuted and convicted the sibling, resulting in a long jail sentence. The threats were 
reported to authorities by another inmate with access to the subject of this case. 
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The reporting inmate also indicated that the subject inmate stated that he intended 
to kill the judge who sentenced his sibling, as well as the prosecutors and their family 
members. He added that he had experience with sniper weapons and hand-to-hand 
combat tactics as a U.S. Marine for five years.336 These statements represent leakage 
warning behavior since they were uttered in confidence to another inmate.337 They also 
indicate the possibility of identification warning behavior, considering the affinity 
expressed for the military and weapons while in the context of this threat.338 
It was also learned that while still incarcerated, the inmate sent letters to the judge 
and prosecutor several years before his release date. The letters did not contain overt 
threats but instead contained the phrase “car accident” written in excess of 80 times in 
each letter, followed by the phrase “good luck.”339 These statements may represent 
leakage or fixation warning behaviors.340 
Since the inmate had served the balance of his sentence, the correctional agency 
had no legal recourse to continue his incarceration. His imminent release caused concern 
among state and local authorities since Virginia’s judges typically operate without 
protective details and may be vulnerable to attack. The VFC coordinated with the 
correctional agency, law enforcement officials in the geographic area where the subject 
was incarcerated, and those in the area where he was to be released. The VFC also 
contacted the probation and parole officials who would be responsible for managing the 
subject while on supervised probation after his release. Assisting in these efforts was the 
USMS who provided expertise in judicial protection. 
Based upon the identifiable warning behaviors, the VFC determined that more 
information and context was necessary. It hosted a series of conference calls with the 
aforementioned organizations to gather all pertinent information pertaining to the subject 
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and his pending release. For example, during one call, it was reported by the local law 
enforcement agency that its records management system was queried for activity at the 
address where the inmate was to be settled upon release. It was revealed that a juvenile 
member of the household and relative of the inmate had recently been accused of 
bringing a firearm to school and making threats toward a specific student. Concern 
developed that the inmate may be introduced to an unstable environment with access to 
firearms upon release. Another example of developments that caused the threat 
management strategy to change involved the interception of jailhouse communications 
between the subject and his mother. These conversations revealed that the subject 
intended to move his residence upon release without making his probation officer aware.  
Each call shed light on limitations and opportunities regarding each stakeholder 
agency. Based upon the information received during each call, coupled with records 
provided by the correctional agency, a threat assessment was conducted regarding 
whether or not the subject posed a threat to his sibling’s prosecutor, the convicting judge, 
or others. Working with the other agencies that had a role in this case, the VFC crafted a 
threat management strategy that was adopted and modified with each conference call. 
Hence, comparisons to the intelligence cycle are relevant as the VFC updated its threat 
assessment and guidance to those managing the subject in the field. Utilizing the 
behavioral threat assessment model allowed the VFC to incorporate structure in the 
analysis it provided to stakeholders, which is deemed preferable to the expert opinion 
offered by a single consultant.341 
The VFC incorporated the directly communicated threat warning behavior with 
other variables to make its analytical judgment.342 These variables included information 
received from the mental health professionals who had interacted with the subject while 
incarcerated, records of the subject’s conduct while incarcerated, his criminal record, his 
military record, and other institutional measures taken of the subject utilized by the 
institution to manage him while incarcerated. The analytical judgments changed as the 
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environmental variables affecting the inmate’s discharge and home plan changed. The 
threat management plan was developed in conjunction with the probation and parole 
personnel, the law enforcement agency where the subject would be living post-release, 
and the social services and mental health providers, representing a multi-disciplinary 
approach that helped inform the overall management strategy.343 
The subject was released after multiple years of incarceration. Based upon the 
threat management strategy facilitated by the VFC, deliberate steps were taken to manage 
him to ensure he did not progress along a pathway to violence while still respecting his 
civil rights and civil liberties as a citizen of Virginia and the United States. As of this 
writing, five months have passed with no violent attempts against those whom he 
previously threatened. The probation and parole staff is intensively supervising the 
subject in cooperation with mental health providers. 
3. Example 3—Potential Campus Shooting Averted 
This final example from the VFC involves a male subject who attends a public 
university in Virginia. The subject first came to the attention of the VFC in mid-
November 2016. A Virginia State Police trooper sent a suspicious activity report to the 
VFC based upon recent contact with a local firearms retailer with whom the trooper had 
frequent contact. The retailer called the trooper to relay an incident that took place in his 
shop earlier in the day.  
A male in his late teens had entered the store and requested to look at several 
semi-automatic magazine-fed rifles similar in appearance to military assault weapons. 
The man then settled on a semi-automatic version of an AK-47 rifle and indicated that he 
wished to purchase it with cash. The storeowner told the man that he reserved the right to 
refuse sale of the weapon to anyone less than 21 years of age. Hearing this, the customer 
immediately lost his temper and began shouting at the shop owner. The customer then 
left the store, got into the car that had brought him, and went to another gun shop located 
across the street. He went inside the second gun shop but immediately left without 
making a purchase and left with the person who had driven him there. It was later learned 
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that the subject saw a uniformed police officer in a patrol car near the second gun shop 
and hastily left without attempting a purchase. 
As a result of the person’s unusually aggressive behavior in the first store, the 
shop owner called the trooper to make notification of the incident, providing a description 
of the man and the license plate of the car in which he had been riding. The trooper 
determined that the driver of the car was an Uber driver and the person who had secured 
the ride was not the same person who rode in the car to the store because the Uber 
account holder was female. The Uber driver was located and interviewed. He stated that 
he had picked up the young male who had then asked to be taken to the nearest gun store. 
The male offered the Uber driver $100 cash tip if he waited for him while he attempted to 
purchase the rifle. The male also revealed that he was from another state and wanted the 
rifle due to protest activities subsequent to the U.S. presidential election.  
At this point, the VFC was notified. The VFC reviewed the SAR and notified the 
FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) task force officer also assigned to the VFC. A 
second Virginia State Police special agent was also called to assist. The matter was 
investigated and the Uber account holder was identified and interviewed. She indicated 
that she ordered the ride for the man because the subject told her that he needed a ride 
and offered to reimburse her with cash. Surveillance images from the first gun shop led to 
the identification of the man of concern. The investigation also revealed that the man had 
been the subject of a criminal investigation where a search warrant was served on his 
university apartment earlier in the day by local police officials. Therefore, the man had 
his apartment searched and vehicle seized by police officers only a few hours before he 
entered the gun shop and attempted to purchase a semi-automatic military style rifle. 
The investigation continued and the man agreed to a consensual interview with 
two Virginia State Police special agents assigned to the VFC. Little was learned, as the 
man was reluctant to discuss his circumstances or reasons for attempting to purchase the 
rifle. Further investigation into open source information pertaining to the subject led 
investigators to conclude that he had a number of stressors influencing him. Among these 
were the recent deaths of his parents (2009 and 2015, respectively), the break-up of a 
romantic relationship, being subject to a criminal investigation in Virginia, having 
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criminal charges pending against him in another state, having little social or familial 
support, and substance abuse.344 
Unlike the previous examples, this case lacked an abundance of warning 
behaviors. The subject did not frequently use social media and his accounts were not 
current. During the criminal investigation, his smartphone was seized and a search 
warrant was obtained for its contents. However, police investigators could not break the 
encryption; thus, an opportunity to detect any potential warning behaviors or criminal 
activities was lost. The attempt to purchase the AK-47 type of rifle may have been an 
attempt to adopt a pseudo-commando persona, possibly representing identification 
warning behavior since the AK-47 rifle is used by many of the world’s militaries, terror 
groups, and other militant organizations.345 However, it was not a strong conclusion 
since the choice of the weapon style was not actually known and a structured conclusion 
could not be reached without more information. 
Since warning behaviors were not immediately available for observation, a 
collaborative effort was pursued to collect and analyze all the individual pieces to obtain 
a more comprehensive understanding of the subject and how to manage him. Since it was 
learned that the subject lived in university housing, had used a third party to secure the 
Uber ride to the gun store shortly after the police served a search warrant on him, had 
become outwardly angry upon being denied the opportunity to purchase the firearm, and 
because he was already under criminal investigation, the VFC concluded that sufficient 
concern existed for continued follow-up. The VFC began communicating with the 
campus police department and the university threat assessment team for the purpose of 
developing a threat management strategy to help the subject steer away from violence. 
The Commonwealth of Virginia requires all publicly funded schools have threat 
assessment teams for the purpose of assessing and preventing violence on school 
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grounds.346 Therefore, the university already had a dedicated team of people who 
understood the threat management process and they immediately engaged with the 
campus police and the VFC threat management personnel. 
The threat management team met and included the VFC staff assigned to the case, 
as well as the campus police department. Management strategies were crafted to help 
steer the subject away from a short-term interest in purchasing a firearm while also 
attempting to identify stabilizing forces in his life to help him consider alternative choices 
to violence.347 These strategies involved the utilization of campus counseling services 
and social networks outside of school.348 Extended family members were identified in 
other states and interviewed by law enforcement personnel in those areas.349 This process 
took several days. 
Six days later, the subject presented himself to another gun dealer in a different 
area near the university. He asked to see a rifle and one of the store attendants showed 
him a more traditional bolt-action style rifle. When the subject completed the paperwork 
for the background check prior to purchasing the weapon, the dealer told him that the 
check was not instant and he may have to wait a few minutes to get the results. Instead of 
waiting, the subject left the store, but without further communicating with the staff. He 
did not return. Later, the same dealer received a notice from the Virginia Firearms 
Transaction Center that the subject was not eligible to make the transaction due to a 
pending criminal charge against him in another state. This event was reported to a 
Virginia State Police trooper by the gun store and it was quickly realized that subject of 
the threat management investigation had again attempted to purchase a firearm. 
Concern among the threat assessment team grew since the determination to buy a 
rifle did not appear to have abated. This development led the campus threat assessment 
team, university police department, and personnel from the VFC to have another threat 
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management meeting to discuss the new development and make determinations about 
what the next steps would be for the subject.350 It was considered whether or not the 
school and the subject were best served by having the school exercise the option to 
remove him from the academic program and university housing due to the criminal 
investigation into his activities while in the school’s housing, compounded with his 
refusal to respond to outreach efforts to help him. The subject’s extended family 
members were also made a part of the process to manage his behavior. One family 
member who had strong rapport with the subject agreed to attempt to broker a resolution 
whereby the subject would accept counseling services and be allowed to remain on 
campus and in classes. However, he was rebuffed. The threat management team 
identified a previous counselor who had a good relationship with the subject and asked 
for his assistance with the management effort. The counselor was able to persuade the 
subject to go out of town with family members for an upcoming long weekend and accept 
a psychological evaluation upon his return. 
The VFC prepared a situational awareness bulletin for the state where the subject 
would be headed for a long weekend, as well as the states through which the subject 
would pass. This report was sent to the fusion centers of these states for the purpose of 
providing some background information should the police encounter the subject for some 
reason and need additional context or information. It would also allow the local campus 
threat management team, through the VFC, to have visibility on such circumstances 
should they occur outside of Virginia. As of this writing, the long weekend away from 
the university is underway and the management of the subject continues. 
During this latter stage of the threat management process, the VFC played an 
important role in conveying the fluidity of the situation to partner agencies in other states 
that would not otherwise know about the circumstances of the threat management effort 
occurring in Virginia. This scenario illustrates the maturity of the network, as well as its 
utility when handling tactical-level issues. The threat assessment process may be the 
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opportunity for fusion centers to connect elements of issues that would have not have 
been connected prior to their establishment. 
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION  
A. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES—TRAINING 
It has been argued in this thesis that fusion centers may operate more proactively 
by incorporating the Behavioral Threat Assessment and Management model as a tool by 
which to prevent mass or targeted violence. However, no plug-and-play training solution 
is available for fusion centers to begin. A host of opportunities exist to train personnel 
and create programs to do this work, but nothing as yet exists specifically for fusion 
centers. 
Also lacking is a common framework for the development of threat assessment 
and management procedures to be used in fusion centers. At this time, the experiences of 
agencies that have been performing this function are of the best value to fusion centers 
that wish to develop this capability. Among these agencies are the USSS, USCP, USMS, 
and the LAPD.  
The DHS, partnering with the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, created a technical assistance program in 2007 designed to support fusion 
centers through a host of developmental requirements.351 These programs provide basic 
training in fusion center operations, fusion center management, SAR, privacy and civil 
liberties, critical thinking, integration of technology, and others.352 However, training is 
not yet dedicated to behavioral threat assessment and management. The closest technical 
assistance topic area is that of SAR since the vetting of behaviors (or the lack thereof) is 
an important element.353 
Lacking a centralized federal training program, where does this leave everyone 
regarding guidance for fusion centers to begin conducting behavioral threat assessments 
and manage cases? Behavioral threat assessment and management conducted by a police 
                                                 
351 U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Justice, DHS/DOJ Fusion Process 
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agency, a college threat assessment and management team, or a fusion center, is different 
from traditional policing methodologies in that it does not seek to punish or aggressively 
confront those who manifest behaviors of concern.354 Performed with the objective of 
preventing targeted violence, the process endeavors to assist people who may be posing 
threats to others or those who are being threatened.355 Like any new operational 
development, establishing a threat assessment and management program requires basic 
and advanced training.356 Professionals who possess relevant qualifications related to 
threat assessment and management may deliver this sort of training.357  
Basic training may take the form of webinars, conferences, workshops, or other 
presentations, delivered by professionals in the field of threat assessment and 
management.358 Further, building beyond basic capabilities, advanced training may take 
the form of tabletop exercises or other practical scenario-based training, administered by 
subject matter experts in the field of threat assessment and management, allowing 
participants to work through realistic scenarios and receive relevant feedback and 
guidance.359 These courses are currently offered in the private sector to help individuals 
and organizations establish their capabilities.360 
ATAP created a program in 2015 for interested persons to become certified threat 
managers.361 Backing the certification with ATAP’s status as a professional organization, 
baseline professional capabilities are established by which to measure a common 
standard of quality for someone to present a certification.362 This certification requires a 
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comprehensive examination of the candidates’ understanding of the current “body of 
knowledge” that exists in the academic literature, comprehension of “core competencies.” 
and the terms and definitions contained in ATAP’s “threat assessment glossary.”363 
Training is a critical need of personnel staffing fusion centers and according to the 
Fusion Center Guidelines: 
It is recommended that fusion centers adhere to the training objectives 
outlined in the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP). In 
addition, it is recommended that personnel working within the center meet 
the core training standards developed by the Global Intelligence Working 
Group (GIWG) and Counter-Terrorism Training Coordination Working 
Group (CTTWG). Each of the six training classifications identified by the 
CIWG (intelligence analyst, intelligence supervisor, law enforcement 
officer, law enforcement executive, intelligence officer/collector, and 
train-the-trainer) have standards.364 
Learning to conduct behavioral threat assessment and management is important to 
developing a capability for staff members within a fusion center to perform this work. 
However, it is also important for a fusion center to develop a structured process by which 
assessments and management activities will be performed. The need for these processes 
is in keeping with recommendations that fusion centers establish structured procedures 
regarding intelligence analysis.365 Each fusion center may establish its own protocols 
pertaining to threat assessments and management cases within the general framework of 
guidance that already exists for fusion centers. 
B. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES—PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 
It has been suggested that the adoption of the all-hazards-all crimes mission by 
fusion centers is worth pursuing so long as the core fusion center responsibility of 
terrorism analysis can be sustained.366 Since fusion centers are operated and managed at 
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the state and local level, balance is required to ensure that state and local needs are being 
met while also serving national priorities as they pertain to threat analysis and efforts to 
deal with terrorism.367 Thus, in this scenario, the needs of state and local agencies may be 
served by fusion centers performing behavioral threat assessment and management 
services. The case examples offered earlier demonstrate how it may occur. 
Looking beyond the immediate training needs of fusion centers or their state and 
local priorities, long-term opportunities also exist for fusion centers to apply behavioral 
threat management programs to address persistently vexing problems with a national 
nexus, particularly the phenomenon of violent extremism in the United States. Studies of 
extremist violence have led to the conclusion that definitive or valuable profiles of 
would-be attackers do not exist.368 Further, Rutgers University Professor John Cohen 
reports that most violent extremists studied in the United States are “self-radicalized, self-
trained, self-executing, and ideologically ignorant.”369 Professor Cohen goes on to note 
that while useful profiles of violent attackers are lacking, behavioral and psychological 
commonalities do exist.370 These behaviors, when placed into appropriate context, may 
be analyzed for the purposes of proactive intervention in attack planning or execution.371 
The warning behaviors noted earlier, when analyzed within a behavioral threat 
assessment process, represent key opportunities to detect and disrupt potential incidents 
of terrorist violence. 
Reactive tactical approaches, made by specialized police tactical teams to arrest 
key offenders or by military campaigns targeting individual terror leaders overseas, offer 
short-term solutions to combatting terrorism or crime because those targeted for arrest or 
assassination (in the case of overseas military actions) are merely replaced by others in 
                                                 
367 McCaul and King, Majority Staff Report on the National Network of Fusion Centers, 13. 
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the same organizations.372 The cycle of removing key leaders or operators through 
special tactics goes unbroken.  
The preventive mission undertaken by fusion centers, and more broadly, the U.S. 
government, offers the greatest opportunity for a lasting strategy to mitigate terrorism and 
prevent violence.373 Thus, fusion centers may support their federal, state, and local 
partners through the multi-disciplinary approaches to prevention by involving those who 
have the opportunities to observe people who may pose risks or harm to others.374 Today, 
fusion centers are increasingly involved with the analysis of open-source social media 
posts. This sort of analysis does not require reams of classified data or secret informants 
because open-source data is growing at a rate that makes it exceedingly valuable.375 
Social media provides excellent real-time insights into events developing across the 
world or events occurring locally.376 Much of the information of use to police agencies 
and fusion centers occurs in the open via social media posts.377 An example occurred in 
in April 2015, days before two radicalized subjects attempted to attack an event in 
Garland, Texas known as a Prophet Muhammad cartoon contest.378 The men, clad in 
body armor and armed with rifles, engaged traffic officers with gunfire after arriving at 
the perimeter of the event.379 However, each attacker was shot and killed by the police 
officers with whom they exchanged gunfire.380 Later, it was determined that one of the 
attackers had made several posts to his Twitter account that may have indicated an intent 
to attack the Garland, Texas event as the subject even used the hashtag “#texasattack.”381 
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This post was among a larger number of social media posts that may have indicated his 
desire or intent to commit a violent attack in Garland, Texas.382 One of the attackers 
began posting his affinity for ISIL approximately six months prior to the attack in 2015, 
which ultimately led the FBI to begin an investigation into him.383  
Fusion centers and police agencies across the country are using a variety of 
services to help observe, digest, and add context to the huge volume of open-source 
social media posts made each day. These tools and their use by police departments and 
fusion centers have become the targets of critics, who often express concern regarding 
activities protected by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. It has been 
suggested that the use of tools that allow law enforcement to observe the posts that 
people make to social media is unacceptable and should be curtailed.384 Following a 
complaint made by the American Civil Liberties Union, social media companies 
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter withdrew their data feeds from a social media 
monitoring service called Geofeedia, which was frequently used by police agencies and 
fusion centers to detect the sort of social media posts noted previously as examples of the 
sorts of posts that may indicate imminent violence.385  
Observation of social media is a real opportunity to detect leakage, identification, 
pathway, fixation, last resort and directly communicated threat warning behaviors.386 
The use of services that help to observe such posts are necessary due to the immense 
volume of data posted to social media each day. Fusion centers and others in the law 
enforcement arena must be proactive by developing policies that govern the proper use of 
social media analysis tools to ensure that privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are 
protected. 
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Adoption of a behavioral threat assessment and management capability in a fusion 
center requires collaborative relationships with a host of organizations that may 
contribute to an assessment or management strategy to prevent violent crime or 
terrorism.387 Indeed, the prevailing objective of any fusion center should be the 
“movement from a reactive response to a proactive and preventive approach” that will 
improve the opportunities for police forces to prevent crime and terrorism but also to help 
the larger public safety community better prepared to respond after unwanted 
emergencies have occurred.388 Making the case for prevention in 2005, Georgetown 
University professor Fathali Moghaddam observed, “prevention is the long-term 
solution,” framing the significance of the issue by adding that policymakers in the United 
States “have no choice but to adopt a preventive approach to terrorism because the 
survival of the United States as a democratic superpower is at stake.”389 Dr. Moghaddam 
continued that repeated attacks against the United States would present significant 
damage to the America’s economy, society, collective psychology, and political 
dynamic.390 Such stakes compel forward action to prevent the violence so damaging to 
the nation. 
Moving forward, the National Network of Fusion Centers continues to grow and 
mature. This maturity means that the core capabilities, which began to be tested by the 
DHS in 2011, have largely been achieved.391 Today, baseline capabilities may now be 
taken for granted and the emerging emphasis for the network is to identify and develop 
new capabilities.392 It is in this spirit that the discipline of behavioral threat assessment 
and management may find new practitioners within the nation’s fusion centers as the 
need to identify threats, investigate them, and mitigate them continues. 
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